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RACE AND REPRESENTATION:
A STUDY OF LEGAL AID ATTORNEYS
AND
THEIR PERCEPTIONS OF THE SIGNIFICANCE OF RACE
Roland Acevedo
Edward Hosp
Rachel Pomerantz*

I.

INTRODUCTION
The story of law in the UnitedStates is largely a story about
one group ofpeople, middle to upper class white males...
making lawfor all others in society.'

• Roland Acevedo, Of Counsel, SeiffKretz & Maffeo, J.D. Fordham University
School of Law; Edward Hosp, Associate, Maynard, Cooper & Gale, P.C., J.D.
Fordham University School of Law; Rachel Pomerantz, Staff Counsel, New
York City Division of Human Rights, J.D. Fordham University School of Law.
The authors wish to thank Professor Russell Pearce, Fordham University School
of Law, whose insight, wisdom, and encouragement guided this project; Belinda
Samuda, for her invaluable assistance in composing the survey questionnaire,
conducting interviews, and analyzing the survey results; and Professor Randolph
Jonakait, New York Law School, for his thoughtful critique.
1 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Excluded Voices: New Voices in the Legal Profession
Making New Voices in the Law, 42 U. MIAMI L. REv. 29 (1987).
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Professor Menkel-Meadow's statement is paradigmatic of the
views of many Feminist and Critical Race scholars that law in the
United States has a long history of exclusion. By formally excludinI
African-Americans and women from legal education and licensure,
and creating barriers for immigrants and "non-nativist" men
attempting to become lawyers, 3 the middle to upper class white males
in this country ensured that the legal profession remained relatively
homogeneous in terms of race, gender, and class. 4 Within the
predominately white, relatively homogeneous American legal
profession, race had little, if any, impact on the law or lawyering.
Today, however, things may be changing as the legal
profession arguably becomes more diverse. As law schools
successfully recruit and retain students and faculty members of color,
and as increasing numbers of lawyers come from previously excluded
minority groups, 5 competing visions ofthe impact that race has on the
law and lawyering have developed in the United States.
See, e.g., Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950) (involving equal protection
challenge by African-American denied admission to University of Texas School of
Law based solely on race); Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938) (challenging a
Missouri statute prohibiting the admission of negroes to law school); Bradwell v.
Illinois, 83 U.S. 130 (1873) (upholding state's refusal to grant woman a license to
ractice law).
2

JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE 15

(1976).
4 See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Culture Clash in the Quality of Life in the Law:
Changes in the Economics, Diversification and Organizationof Lawyering, 44
CASE W. RES. L. REv. 621, 625 (1994); see also ERWIN N. GRISWOLD, LAW AND
LAWYERS IN THE UNITED STATES 59 (1965) ("[P]rospective lawyers come
disproportionately from one element of the population, ... the educated upper
middle class.").
5 See Menkel-Meadow, supranote 1. Although the overall number
of minority
attorneys is increasing at the 25 largest firms in New York City, some groups are
still underrepresented. See Edward A. Adams, Firms' Minority Hiring Benefits
Asian-Americans, N.Y.L.1, Apr. 18, 1996, at 1, 2. African-Americans, who
comprise 7.5 percent of the student body at the nation's 178 ABA approved law
schools during 1994-95, account for only 4.6 percent of the associate positions at
New York's 25 largest law firms. See id.
Latinos, who make up 5.3 percent of the

entire law school student body, are also vastly under-represented--they account for
only 2.6 of all associate positions at New York's 25 largest firms. See id. While

African-Americans and Latinos are under-represented at New York's largest firms,
Asian-Americans are over-represented.
Asian-Americans account for
approximately 7 percent of all associate positions at the 25 largest firms but make
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One view, with probable roots in the legal professions history
of exclusion, posits that race has, or should have, no impact on the
law or legal representation. 6 Part II of this paper sets forth this
Neutrality Model, or the Professional Identity Model as it is
sometimes called, of law, society and lawyering. Under this model,
lawyers, because of extensive socialization and training in law
school, apply their skills equally to all clients, regardless of the race,
ethnicity, gender, or sexual orientation 7 of the attorney or client. Part
II begins by discussing the importance of neutrality, or the
appearance of neutrality in the law. This part then briefly discusses
the movement in the United States that seeks to eliminate race
consciousness in order to eliminate racism. Part II concludes with a
discussion of lawyering under the Neutrality Model.
Part III of this paper sets forth a view in opposition to the
Neutrality Model, the Race Consciousness Model of lawyering. The
Race Consciousness Model is based on the premise that individuals
who share common personal identity factors such as race feel an
affinity for one another that enhances communication and
understanding between them.
Since communication and
understanding is vital to the attorney-client relationship, the race of
both the attorney and the client has an impact on lawyering and is a
factor that should be taken into consideration. Part III begins by
discussing the flawed concept of neutrality in a culture that has been
dominated by one race for centuries. Part III then discusses specific
criticisms of Professor Sanford Levinson's theories of lawyering,
up only 5.6 percent of the law school student body. See id.
6

See, e.g.,

AUERBACH,

supranote 3, at 261 (noting that in modem professional

history lawyers have repeatedly offered neutral principles to achieve particular
results).
7 Personal characteristics such as race, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation,

religion, etc., will be collectively referred to as "personal identity factors" in this
paper.
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arguing that personal identity factors continue to play a part in the
consciousness of law students and lawyers.
Part IV begins with a discussion of the relationship between
poverty and the provision of legal services. Part IV also discusses the
criticisms of poverty law expressed by Mary and Paul Lee in the
Summer, 1993 Special Edition of The Clearinghouse. In their article,
the Lees argue that most legal services offices are failing to
adequately address the needs of their clients. The Lees attribute this
failure to the lack of attorneys of color, particularly at the
management level where policy is set, in offices that primarily serve
people of color. Some of the Lees' points will be tested through our
survey of Legal Aid attorneys.
Part IV also examines a survey of attorneys of the Civil
Division of The Legal Aid Society of the City of New York (Legal
Aid) as a test ground for both the Neutrality and Race Consciousness
Models. Because Legal Aid's clients are overwhelmingly people of
color, the survey presents an opportunity to examine white attorneys'
interaction with people of color and attorneys of color interaction
with either members of their own racial group or, if not their own
racial group, with people who are not members of the dominant race.
Part IV discusses this questionnaire and the methodology employed
in surveying Legal Aid attorneys. Basically, the questionnaire
focused on issues of race and the attorneys' relationships with their
clients, the courts, and their colleagues. This part then discusses the
demographics of the Civil Division of The Legal Aid Society, the test
ground for the survey. Part IV concludes with an analysis of the
survey results using the Neutrality or Race Consciousness Models.
This paper concludes that the majority of Legal Aid's
attorneys recognize race as a significant factor in their professional
lives. The perception of the significance of race in their work,
however, differs markedly among attorneys of color and white
attorneys. Attorneys of color view race as an advantage in facilitating
and enhancing communications with their clients of color.
Conversely, attorneys of color view race as a disadvantage in the
treatment they receive in the workplace and the treatment they and
their clients receive from the courts. White attorneys were less likely
to perceive the effects of race on the attorney-client relationship, yet
were aware that race has an impact on the treatment their clients
receive from the judicial system.
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While there are clearly differences in how attorneys of color
and white attorneys perceive race and its impact on the attorney-client
relationship, neither the Neutrality Model nor the Race
Consciousness Model adequately explain the differences in the
perceptions between the two groups of attorneys. Rather, it appears
that Legal Aid attorneys are operating under a hybrid of the two
models that results when attorneys exhibit their group and
organization identities. The existence of this hybrid supports the
conclusion that neither group of attorneys steadfastly adheres to the
"Rule of Law" and its principles of neutrality. Perhaps, then, the time
has arrived for law schools to abandon the pursuit of colorblindness
and to begin teaching students to be conscious and sensitive to the
issue of race. Our law schools must begin to teach students that race
consciousness and sensitivity can be learned, regardless of one's race,
class, ethnicity, or other personal identity factors.
I.

THE THEORY OF NEUTRALITY

A.

The Rule of Law

The government of the United States has been8 emphatically
termed a government of laws, and not of men.
One of the principles that allows our system of justice to
continue functioning, to continue to be legitimate, is neutrality. The
notion that the law functions through an impartial application of rules
is probably the most important block in the legal system's foundation
and is commonly referred to as "The Rule of Law."
Under this model, parties engaged in a dispute bring the
matter to the court. The judge, or the jury, listens to the parties'
stories, more than likely through the lens of the lawyer, and
determines the facts. Once the "facts" have been uncovered, the
judge simply applies the existing law to those facts.
In this scenario, there need be no mention of the race or
ethnicity of any of the players. Presumably, an African-American
8 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).

6
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judge has the same laws to apply as a white judge. The facts in the
dispute should not change if one of the parties is Latino. Nor should
the identity of the jury be of any relevance to the outcome of the trial.
This commitment to neutrality can be seen in the above
quotation from Marbury v. Madison. Since Chief Justice Marshall
wrote these words in 1803, they have been cited in opinions over and
over again. 9 In many instances, they are cited by a judge who seems
to want the reader to think that she would like to rule otherwise, that
she recognizes that the decision looks, on its face, to be unfair, but
that she has no choice. We are, after all, a nation of laws.
Put another way, the Rule of Law demands that there be a
high level of generality. As Professor Margaret Radin wrote,
"Generality implies that the rules are broader (more general) than
specific cases or particulars, which can be brought within them, or
seen to be comprehended, subsumed, or covered by them. All
particulars of specific cases that fall under the rule are covered by the
rule."' 0 Under Professor Radin's conception of generality, for
example, if a rule states that no one under 21 years old is permitted in
a saloon, that rule applies to all people under 21 years old and to all
saloons." A judge presented with a violation of this rule has no
choice but to apply the neutral law to the facts of the case and, as
noted above, the additional characteristics of the individuals involved
are not important. The only two relevant facts for the judge in this

9

A Westlaw search found over one hundred Supreme Court cases citing this

phrase.

0 Margaret J.Radin, Reconsidering the Rule ofLaw, 69 B.U. L. REv.781, 785

(1989). Professor Radin discusses the "instrumental" components of the Rule of
Law as discussed by LON FULLER inTHE MORALITY OF LAW (rev. ed. 1969).
According to Fuller, there are eight components of the Rule of Law: 1) Generality,
2) Notice or Publicity, 3) Prospectivity, 4) Clarity, 5) Non-Contradictoriness, 6)

Conformability, 7) Stability, and 8) Congruence. See id. For the purposes of this
study, we will focus only on generality. Professor Radin also discusses JOHN
RAwLs's theories in A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971). According to Radin, Rawls
believes that the Rule of Law is "the regular and impartial administration of public

rules."' Id.
at 787. Although the rule is formulated somewhat differently, the
notion of the "impartial[ity]" of the Rule of Law is essentially the same as the idea
of "generality" in Fuller's theories.

" See id.

1999-2000

Race and Representation

case are:12 1) the age of the customer; and 2) that the building was a
saloon.

When we discuss legal rights and remedies, issues ofpersonal
identity are not part ofthe equation. As Professor Jennifer Nedelsky
points out, often the parties involved in the dispute are so abstracted
that they are often represented by letters -- "If A does this to B...
,,13 Because the Rule of Law is neutral, is impartial, A's gender or
race can be, in some ways must be, abstracted out of the hypothetical.
As Nedelsky points out, "If... there are no interchangeable As and
Bs, if each event is completely unique in its necessary specificity,
then treating' 14like cases alike will be of little help in achieving
impartiality.
Without this commitment to neutrality, law would cease to be
legitimate. If people believed that the sort of justice that you were
accorded depended on personal identity factors, such as race, rather
than the impartial application of neutral laws, there would no longer
be any reason to adhere to the law. 15
B.

A Raceless Nation
Our Constitutionis color-blind....

6

Although Justice Harlan wrote these words in the dissent in
Plessy v. Ferguson, his notion of the "colorblind" constitution
survived and eventually prevailed. Today, the notion that laws must
be passed and applied without notice of race is a fundamental part of
See id.
Jennifer Nedelsky, The Challenges ofMultiplicity, Inessential Woman:
Problems ofExclusion in FeministThought, 89 MICH. L. REv. 1591, 1602 (1991)
(reviewing ELIZABETH SPELMAN'S book, INESSENTIAL WOMAN (1988)).
14 Id. at 1606.
12

13

A recent example of a large group of people disregarding the law because of a
strong belief that the law is not impartially applied is the riots in Los Angeles
15

following the acquittal of a number of white police officers charged with brutally
beating Rodney King, an African-American. See, e.g., Ted Gest & Betsy Streisand,
A Question ofFairness,U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Aug. 1, 1994, at 23 (discussing

how people's perception of the unfairness of the criminal justice system triggered a
major riot).
16

Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).

8
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ourjurisprudence.17 More importantly, though, it is also a major part
of our society's notions of how we ought to treat differences between
people. Not only is our constitution supposed to be colorblind, but so
is our entire society.
As the nation attempted, in the 1960s and 70s, to free itself
from its past of racial subordination and segregation, race
18
consciousness became, in many respects, equated with racism.
According to Professor Gary Peller, "progress [in eliminating racial
oppression is identified] with the transcendence of a racial
consciousness about the world."' 19 According to this view, race is not
an attribute that accounts for any difference between people. Thus, to
use it as a measure of someone is irrational. Instead, it is necessary to
focus on the commonalities that all people share.
Professor Nedelsky observed this commitment in the 1960s
and 1970s to "sameness" across racial groups in the television
program Sesame Street. In one Sesame Street segment, children of
different ethnic groups played while the background music
proclaimed, "Whoever you are, whatever you look like, underneath
we are all the same. ' 20 This was the message of the 1960s, that "[w]e
are all really the same; differences do not matter.,'2 Similarly,
according to the integrationalists, "race makes no real difference
between people, except as unfortunate historical vestiges ofirrational
17

See, e.g, City of Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469 (1989).

18 See Gary Peller, Race Consciousness, 1990 DUKE L.J. 758, 773-74 ("In short,

the symmetry of the integrationist picture is rooted in the idea that racism consists
of possessing a race consciousness about the world. . . ."). However, race
consciousness was also an important part of the struggle for "equality." See
discussion, infra, at Part IV. Peller uses the term integrationalist for those who
advocate increased interaction between different races in order to eliminate
discrimination.
'9

Id. at 760.

Nedelsky, supranote 13, at 1604. Professor Nedelsky is paraphrasing the song,
which continues, "We laugh when we are happy.... We cry when we are sad, we
shiver when we are cold, we sweat when we are hot." Id.
21 Id. But see HENRY LOUIS GATES, JR., COLORED PEOPLE (1994) (recounting the
memoirs of the chairman of Harvard's Department of African-American studies,
which includes discussion on the black power movement in the United States that
sought to heighten racial awareness and taught blacks that it didmatter ifyou were
20

not white); Frederick D. Robinson, The Rhetoric of Victimization that isParalyzing

BlackAmerica,CHI. TRJB, Jan. 14, 1991, at 9 (discussing racism and discrimination
among African-Americans that has carried over from the black power movement).
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discrimination." 22 The integrationalist view posits that the use or
consideration of race is the cause of discrimination and of
subordination. The goal, then, of the integrationalists, was the
elimination of the consideration of race altogether. As Peller points
out, some believed that continued exposure to people who were
different in identity factors would not only lead to the realization that
those differences were irrelevant, but would result in those
differences actually disappearing.23
Since the 1960s and 70s, the goal of colorblindness has been
adopted by conservatives and other groups. Under the new
formulation, a commitment to race-neutral measures is used to strike
down affirmative action policies designed to assist historically
disadvantaged groups. The commitment to "neutral" measures
continues, "even if it results in segregated institutions. ' 24 Facial
neutrality is seen as a commitment to meritocracy, where "once the
law had performed its 'proper' function of assuring equality of
process, differences in outcomes between groups would not reflect
past discrimination but rather 25real differences between groups
competing for societal rewards.,
The commitment to "sameness," or neutrality in society, tends
to lead people away from focusing on the personal identity factors of
other individuals. The combination of the neutrality of the Rule of
Law and the commitment to a colorblind society creates an
environment where race is something to be ignored. This carries over
to how we train lawyers and how lawyers are expected to interact
with clients.
22 Peller, supranote 18, at 772.

23

See id, at 771. Peller quotes from T. SHIBUTANI & K. KWAN, ETHNIC
STRATIFICATION: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH (1965):
Human beings throughout the world are fundamentally alike.... Hence,
whenever distance is reduced, individuals recognize their resemblances...
Whenever men interact informally, the common human nature comes
through. It would appear, then, that it is only a matter of time before a
more enlightened citizenry will realize this. Then, there will be a
realignment of group loyalties, and ethnic identity will become a thing of
thepast.
Id.at 771 n.23 (emphasis added).
24

Id. at 777.

Kimberle Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformationand
Legitimation in AntidiscriminationLaw, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1344 (1988).
25
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The Neutrality Model for Lawyers

The triumph of what might be termed the standardversion of
the professionalproject would, I believe, be the creation, by
purely fungible
virtue of professional education, of almost
26
members of the professionalcommunity.
This general notion, combined with the overwhelming
commitment in the law to neutrality, can explain the project that
Professor Levinson describes. Just as we expect a neutral judge to
27
apply the law regardless of her race or the parties' ethnic groups,
Professor Levinson envisions a neutral lawyer applying her talents
equally for a client of any racial or ethnic group.
Under Levinson's model, the profession of law is itself a
community, not unlike a racial community. In discussing the legal
profession as a community, Professor Levinson refers to the work of
Steven Cohen when he writes "'professions are potential
communities; and, as such, they might serve as surrogates and
replacements' for other kinds of communities.' 28 Cohen claims that
"some professions could conceivably rival ethnic and religious
communities in many ways. 29 This community socializes its
members into its own values--in law, to value neutrality. The goal of
law school then, according to Professor Levinson, is to so ingrain a
professional identity that personal identity factors vanish. As
"'bleach[es] out' . . . merely
Levinson describes it, law school
30
contingent aspects of the self.",
Sanford Levinson, Identifying the Jewish Lawyer: Reflections on the
ConstructionofProfessionalldentity,14 CARDOzo L. REv. 1577, 1578-79 (1993).
27 See, e.g., Leslie Bender, Feminist (Re)Torts: Thoughts on the Liability Crisis,
26

Mass Torts, Power and Responsibilities, 1990 DuKE L.J. 848, 884 (1990) ("[W]e
are encouraged to believe that our justice system and its courts are a public space
where all citizens will have equal voices before the law, even if race, gender, class,
sexual orientation, disability, or other factors disadvantage people elsewhere in our
society."); Jeffrey R. Pankratz, NeutralPrinciplesand the Right to NeutralAccess
to the Courts, 67 IND. L.J. 1091, 1094 (1992) ("[A] judge must neutrally derive,
define and apply legal principles.").
28 Levinson, supra note 26.
29 Id.
30 Id.at 1578.
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Once a student has been put through the rigorous training of
three years of law school, then, her identity has been reconstructed.3 '
Her identity as a professional is such that "apparent aspects of the
self [s]uch as one's race, gender, religion, or ethnic background would
become irrelevant to defining one's capabilities as a lawyer." 32 In
some aspects, this notion ofthe professional replacing the personal is
already familiar to lawyers. For example, many of the rules of ethics
that lawyers must follow no doubt conflict with many attorneys'
personal conceptions of what is right.3 3 However, as Levinson points
out, to remain in the profession requires that one allow professional
ethics to "supersede personal ethics. 34
To accept the Neutrality Model, or the Professional Identity
Model as Professor Levinson calls it, is to accept that law school can
sufficiently retrain individuals to apply their talents regardless of
personal identity. Therefore, according to Levinson's model, race not
only should not be a factor in the attorney client relationship, but it
absolutely is not a factor if law school has done its job.

Levinson notes that a professor of his once referred to the law school experience
as similar to training in"aMaoist thought reform camp." Id.at 1601. According to
31

Levinson, "Just as Mao held out the promise of becoming the new socialist man or
woman, so did law school promise the redemptive possibility of becoming
transformed into the lawyer." Id.
32 Id. at 1579.
33 One example of a case where the rules of ethics conflicted with an attorney's
conception of what is right and wrong occurred in the often cited People v. Belge,
41 N.Y.2d 60 (1976). In Beige, an attorney who was appointed by the court to
represent a criminal defendant charged with murder learned about a second murder
victim during the course of confidential communications with his client. In an
attempt to confirm the information about the second homicide received from his
client, the attorney went to the site where his client had indicated he buried the

body and found the corpse there. After discovering the dead body, the attorney did
not inform the authorities or even the victim's family. Here, the lawyer was faced
with the dilemma of preserving the confidence learned from his client, as required
by the Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 4-101, or revealing the

whereabouts of the body so that the victim's parents would know that their daughter
was dead and could give her an appropriate funeral and burial.
34 Levinson, supranote 26, at 1578 (quoting Monroe H. Freedman, Professional
Responsibility of the CriminalDefense Lawyer: The Three HardestQuestions,64
MICH. L. REv. 1469, 1482 n.26 (1966)).

12
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THE RACE CONSCIOUSNESS MODEL

A.

A Critique on Neutrality In Law & Society

As discussed above, the legitimacy of the Rule of Law is
premised on the idea that law is itself neutral. However, there are
many who question the notion that law is or even can be truly neutral.
In a nation where laws have been historically passed and applied by
the dominant white male culture, what appears on its face to be
35
neutral is possibly neutral only from the dominant perspective.
The neutrality discussed above has been criticized by both
Feminist and Critical Race theorists. According to many of these
critiques, what is considered neutral is actually the product of
hundreds of years of dominance by one group (whites) over the rest
of society. It has long been recognized that a law that appears to be
neutral may, in fact, be intentionally discriminatory. 6 Even if a law
is not intentionally discriminatory, it may have results that
disadvantage one group in favor of another. 37 The mistake that is
made in proclaiming the law neutral is that it overlooks 1) the long

35

See, e.g., AUERBACH, supra note 3, at 261 (noting that lawyers in modem

professional history have repeatedly offered neutral principles to achieve particular
results).
36 See, e.g, Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886). Yick Wo concerned an

ordinance prohibiting the operation of laundries in wooden buildings. The effect of
the law was to put all laundries operated by people of Chinese descent out of
business. According to the Court,

"[t]hough the law itself be fair on its face, and impartial inappearance, yet
if it is applied and administered by public authority with an evil eye and
an unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal
discriminations between persons in similar circumstances, material to their
rights, the denial of equal justice is still within the prohibition of the
constitution."
Id at 373-74.

37

See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). Washington v. Davis

concerned an aptitude test given to candidates for the District of Columbia police
force. African-American candidates were more than four times as likely to fail the
test than white applicants. Despite this discrepancy, the Supreme Court held that
mere disparate impact did not invalidate the test. But see State v. Russell, 477

N.W.2d 259 (Minn. 1991) (holding a drug statute that adversely impacted on
African-Americans to be unconstitutional).
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term effects of this domination, 2) the identities of the rule makers
38
and 3) the "norms" that are used by them in formulating the rules.
For example, Professor Kimberle Crenshaw notes that "[the]
belief in color-blindness... would make no sense at all in a society
in which identifiable groups had actually been treated differently
historically and in which the effects of this difference in treatment
continued into the present." 39 Racism has been, to a large extent, so
ingrained in our world, that "it is a part of our common historical
experience, and, therefore, a part of our culture." 40 Professor
Lawrence's argument, which is similar to Crenshaw's, is that racism
cannot be addressed by simply stating, "From now on you will not
discriminate." The underlying foundation of society must be
examined. More practically, attention must be paid not to process,
but to results. 41 Facially neutral classifications cannot be actually
neutral when society itself is unfairly constituted.
There is an additional difficulty, though, in eradicating
societal unfairness when many believe so strongly that its structure is
inherently fair. There are those who argue that it is extremely
difficult, if not impossible, for members of dominant groups to
objectively recognize their advantages and to identify the
disadvantages of subordinated groups around them. This may be a
product of self interest, where to recognize the unfairness may be the
See, e.g, Barbara J. Flagg, "Was Blind, But Now I See": White Race

38

Consciousness and the Requirement of DiscriminatoryIntent, 91 MICH. L. REV.

953, 955. Flagg states:

The most striking characteristic of whites' consciousness of whiteness is
that most of the time we don't have any. I call this the transparency
phenomenon: the tendency of whites not to think about whiteness, or
about norms, behaviors, experiences, or perspectives that are whitespecific. Transparency often is the mechanism through which white
decisionmakers who disavow white supremacy impose white norms on
blacks. Transparency operates to require black assimilation even when
pluralism is the articulated goal; it affords substantial advantages to whites

over blacks even when decisionmakers intend to effect substantive racial
justice.

Id.

39

Crenshaw, supra note 25, at 1345.

Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection:Reckoning
with Unconscious Racism, 39 STANFORD L. REv. 317, 330 (1987)
40

41

See Crenshaw, supranote 25, at 1345.
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first step in ending it; or, merely self delusion, since many are
sincerely uncomfortable with the notion that they may have achieved
their current level of success in a world where the deck is stacked in
their favor.42
In her article entitled White Privilege,Male Privilege, Peggy
McIntosh notes that even where men may be willing to admit that
women are disadvantaged, they are still unwilling to acknowledge
that men are unfairly advantaged.43 Professor McIntosh sets forth a
list of conditions and privileges that she can be assured of as a
member of the dominant race. 44 She makes the same observation of
whites that she makes of men, claiming that "whites are carefully
taught not to recognize white privilege." 5 Perhaps in a more benign
reading, it may be that whites, because oftheir position in society, do
not have to examine race at all; it simply does not occur to them.46
Under these arguments, current law is not neutral. It only
appears neutral to those of the dominant group, whites, and more
narrowly, white men. For the rest of society, this claim of neutrali
is clearly not correct and fosters a sense of exclusion and unfairness. 47
Interestingly, under this view, it may be much more difficult for people who
have not achieved the highest level of "success" as our culture defines it (i.e.,
money, power, fame, etc.) to recognize racism than those at "higher" levels.
42

43 Peggy McIntosh, White Privilege,Male Privilege,THE LEGALPROFESSION AND
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY, Jan. 1991, at 99. Copy on file with the authors.
44 Professor McIntosh lists 46 "skin-color privileges" that she is assured of simply

by being white. Some of the privileges are: being able to afford housing in an area
in which she would want to live; having neighbors who will be neutral or pleasant
to her; the ability to speak in public without a powerful male group putting her race
on trial; doing well in a situation without being called a credit to my race; never
being asked to speak for all the people in my own racial group; going to a public
accommodation without fearing that people of my own race cannot get in or will be
mistreated; and going shopping alone with the assurance that I will not be followed
or harassed. See id.
at 103-07.
45 Id.at 99. The tendency of whites not to think about whiteness or about norms,
behaviors, experiences, or perspectives that are white-specific is also known as the
"transparency phenomenon." Flagg, supranote 38, at 953, 957 (1993).
46 Nedelsky, supranote 13, at 1595 (describing her son's apparent obliviousness
to
racial differences aid wondering whether this is "'because, as a child of the
culturally dominant group, he need not learn 'that the white world is dangerous and
that if he does not understand its rules it may kill him."' (quoting ELIZABETH
SPELMAN, INESSENTIAL WOMAN
47 See infraPart I.

(1988))).
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The implications of this perception for the training oflawyers and for
the practice of law--especially for whites--is that more attention must
be paid to racial differences. As section B, infra, discusses, whites
may be unaware and unfamiliar with the lives oftheir clients of color
to such an extent that failure to take racial differences into account
48
may mean missing a large part of the client's story and problem.
B.

The Persistence of Identity Factors and the
Potential for "Bleaching Out"

Some have argued that the civil fights movement of the 1960s
reawakened the interest of groups in their different racial and ethnic
identities. 49 Led by increasing assertions by African-Americans of
racial pride, there was a general rediscovery of etinicity, and of pride
in difference.50 With the focus on different groups' subjective
experience of the world came the idea that there was little or no
commonality. The subjective experiences of people of specific
backgrounds shape their worldviews in different ways. Professor
Nedelsky wrote ofthis danger in her piece on the illusion of the Rule
of Law. 51 According to Nedelsky's theory, a set of circumstances can
appear different to members of different identity groups. The
resulting lack of commonality means that "[w]hat we think of as
common sense may make little sense or even be offensive to someone
of a different identification background. 52
According to the Race Consciousness Model, society trains
people in the roles that it expects of them. In many ways, those roles
are based on biological factors, such as sex and race. These identities
48

See Kimberle Crenshaw, Foreward: Toward a Race-ConsciousPedagogy in

Legal Education, 11 NAT'L BLACK L.J. 1, 2 n.4 (1988) (noting that "[w]hites,

although aware that racial subordination is a problem, are unlikely to view racism
as a constant or central feature of American life").
49
Clayton P. Alderfer & David A. Thomas, The Significance of Race and
Ethnicity for Understanding OrganizationalBehavior, INT'L REV. OF INDUS. &
ORGANIZATIONAL PSYCHOL., at 6, 8-9 (1988).
5o See id.
51 See Nedelsky, supra note 13.
52 Bill Ong Hing, RaisingPersonalIdentificationIssues of Class,Race, Ethnicity,
Gender,Sexual Orientation,PhysicalDisability,andAge in Lawyering Courses,45
STAN. L.REv. 1807, 1810 (1993). Thus, under this view, even "common" sense is
a relative concept.
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are socially ingrained at an early age. To a large degree, many
believe that our culture teaches African-Americans that the role of
blacks in this society is a role of subordination.53 Those who believe
that differences such as race continue to affect the way individuals
behave generally acknowledge the profound, but in some ways
subtle, effects that racism embedded in our society has. For some,
racism is beneath the surface, which makes a full examination of it
and its effects very difficult. 54 This is the view expressed by Charles
Lawrence in his piece on subconscious racism. 55 According to
Lawrence, society's racism is ingrained in all of us to such an extent
that we are no longer able to fully evaluate how it informs our
opinions and actions. 56 Because we lack the ability to examine these
biases and roles, we cannot effectively "reconstitute" ourselves to
eliminate them.57
As Alderfer and Thomas put it, "Racial and Ethnic groups
vary intheir experiences, and as a consequence, develop unique ways
of understanding their relationships to other groups." 58 This may
make lawyering for members of different groups especially difficult.
The task is even more difficult for lawyers of the dominant culture
who serve clients of color. In these instances, lawyers who have
likely not been forced to examine their own ethnicity must attempt to
interpret the narrative of others. 59 The assumption that the client
narrative can be heard and easily comprehended by both parties is no
5

See Nedelsky, supra note 13 (reviewing ELIZABETH SPELMAN'S book,
II ESSENTIAL WOMEN (1988)).
54
See Anthony Alfieri, Stances, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 1233, 1249 (1992)

(discussing the work of Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic).
55 Lawrence, supranote 40.
56

Id.

57 See Alfieri, supranote 54, at 1250.
58 Alderfer & Thomas, supranote 49, at 13.
59 Alderfer and Thomas discuss several reasons that people deny their own
ethnicity. Among these is the fact that people may perceive that they have no
ethnicity- they are of the dominant group. This applies to members of the majority
who are never forced to live within another culture's identity. Alderfer & Thomas,
supra note 49, at 9. For a similar analysis, see Nedelsky, supranote 13, at 1595.
See also McIntosh, supra note 43. Professor McIntosh lists several things that she
considers part of the "invisible package of unearned assets" that white people in the
United States have by virtue of their race. According to Professor McIntosh, the
package is not generally seen by those who possess it. Id. at 102.

1999-2000

Race and Representation

longer valid. With different socialization comes different priorities,
different ways of thinking, even different languages. Some believe
that the group identity will survive professional training. For
example, even as Alderfer and Thomas acknowledge that
organizational identity will influence a person's behavior and attitude,
they also argue that the group identity that an individual brings60to the
organization will possibly remain the most significant factor.
Long before Professor Levinson set forth his Professor
Identity Model, 61 Kimberle Crenshaw wrote a piece that sharply
contradicted the notion of neutrality in the law. 62 As discussed
above, Professor Crenshaw believes that the neutrality that Levinson
describes is not neutral at all, but is the product -ofthe "dominant
view in academe that legal analysis can be taught without directly
addressing conflicts of individual values, experiences and world
views." 63
Professor Crenshaw refers to this notion as
"perspectivelessness."64
Professor Crenshaw discusses the alienation that law students
of color feel in a classroom that treats issues and people as
interchangeable without regard to race and gender. 65 By training
lawyers without referring to race, white students are not challenged to
examine what they consider to be neutral or the "norm," and students
of color are presented with the dilemma of choosing
between what
66
the professor says, and their own experiences.
Due to the intensely personal nature of the legal profession,
group identity differences probably do have an effect on the attorneyclient relationship. One of the few pieces that deals with this topic 67
is
Levinson.
Professor
to
response
Pearce's
Professor Russell
60 Alderfer & Thomas, supranote 49, at 6. Professors Alderfer and Thomas break

identity into two categories: organizational groups, and identity groups.
Organizational groups are generally based on task or function. Identity groups are
based on biological or cultural similarity.
61 See supraPart II.C.
62 Crenshaw, supranote 48.
63 Id at 2.
64
65

id.

Id. at 3.

66 See id. at 9.
67 Russell G. Pearce, Jewish Lawyering in a MulticulturalSociety: Midrash on

Levinson, 14 CARDOZO L.REV. 1613, 1631-36 (1993).

18

BUFFALO PUBLIC INTEREST LAW JOURNAL

VOL. XVIII

According to Professor Pearce, the available research tends to refute
Professor Levinson's claims that group identity can effectively be
"bleached out" through socialization and training in the methods and
values of the profession. 68 Research also seems to indicate that the
fact that a group identity does not involve the voluntary adherence
to
69
a system of beliefs will make that group identity less relevant.
Individuals who have shared a set of assumptions and
traditions from birth should feel an affinity for one another that those
from different identity groups may not. If this is so, the relationship
of lawyer and client would unquestionably be affected. Those who
share a common identity group factor such as race, should feel better
able to communicate their needs and their feelings to others of the
same race. Their shared identity would facilitate understanding and
allow for more productive counseling. What little scholarship there is
in this area seems to support this theory. For example, in discussing
the mock interviews conducted by law students in his course on
"Lawyering Process for Social Change," Professor Ong Hing
observes that, "[i]nvariably, it becomes apparent that interviewers of
similar identification backgrounds are able to pick up on subtle cues
70
or signals from the interviewees that others might miss."
If this is the case, then Professor Levinson's model would
seem to be an inadequate description for lawyering in a multi-cultural
environment. A lawyer of color carries with her experiences as a
person of color in a society dominated by whites. In contrast, a white
attorney who represents a client of color may not be prepared to fully
relate to the client if she approaches the client with a set of
68

Id.at 1632-33. Professor Pearce relies primarily on the work of Professors

Alderfer and Thomas.
69 See id.at 1632.

Ong Hing, supranote 52, at 1814. In his course Professor Ong Hing first has
his students watch a videotaped simulation of an interview between a white
attorney and an African-American client. The interview is intentionally awkward,
due in part to the class and racial differences between the client and the attorney.
After watching the video interview, each student in Ong Hing's class is then
required to conduct two videotaped interview exercises in which another student
plays a tenant with problems seeking legal assistance. After the interviews are
taped, Professor Ong Hing then reviews the tapes with the class, focusing on the
personal identity factors involving the lawyers and clients of different genders,
races, and ethnicities.
70
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assumptions that do not apply beyond her dominant culture.
Accordingly, lawyers and law schools may be more effective if they
adopt a model that takes.the race of both the attorney and the client
into account. Approaching the attorney-client relationship with the
knowledge that there may or may not be a shared set of assumptions
and constructs may allow the attorney to listen more carefully to the
client. This may, in turn, allow the attorney to more fully understand
the client and the client's perspective.
As shown below, neither theory described in this section tells
the entire story. However, to the extent that the attorneys interviewed
in our survey believed that race was a factor in their representation of
people of color, it seems as though the Race Consciousness Model is
a more accurate account of what goes on in the lawyer-client
relationship.
IV.

THE DEMOGRAPHICS OF POVERTY AND THE PROVISION OF
LEGAL SERVICES

A.

Race and Poverty

The connection between race andpoverty is undeniable.7'
Paul E. Lee & Mary M. Lee, in an article in Clearinghouse
Review, assess the state of legal services today, arguing that despite
"hard work by legal services advocates, the plight of poor clients is as
bad as or worse now than at any time during the 25 years that legal
services programs have been in existence." 72 The plight of poor
people generally seems to be worsening; there has been only "slight"
progress "toward the reduction of poverty between 1968 and 1993.7
In 1991, one out of seven Americans (14.2 percent) were poor; this
71

Paul E. Lee & Mary M. Lee, Reflections from the Bottom of the Well: Racial

Bias in the ProvisionofLegalServices to the Poor,27 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 311,
312 (1993).
72 Id. at 312.
73 John Charles Boger, Race and the American City: The Kerner Commission in
Retrospect-An Introduction,71 N.C.L. REV. 1289 (1993) (discussing the Kemer

Commission, part of President Johnson's War On Poverty, which explored the
explicit links between racial discrimination and urban poverty, and evaluating those
findings in light of 1993 statistics).
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percentage represents 35.7 million people, and was larger than any
year since 1967, with the exception of the deep recession years of
1982 through 1984.74 People of color continue to be poor at a higher
rate than whites; in 1991, the poverty rate was 32.7 percent among
African Americans, 28.7 percent among Latinos, and 12 percent
among Asian Pacific Americans, as compared to 11.3 percent among
whites. 75 Gender as well as race affects poverty. A majority of the
poor in the United States are women; in 1991, 76
20.6 million females
were poor, as compared to 15.1 million males.
Many of the anti-poverty programs created in the 1960's
explicitly acknowledged that the eradication of racial discrimination
was crucial to the elimination ofpoverty. 7 The strategy of President
Johnson's original "War on Poverty," as embodied in the Economic
Opportunity Act of 1964,7 was "primarily a strategy of providing an
equal start and an equal opportunity to all Americans, regardless of
their race or economic background. 79 Many initiatives of the "War
on Poverty," including the Civil Rights Act of 196480 and the Voting
Rights Act of 1965," "challenged racially discriminatory barriers to
opportunity and to participation in the political process, [which are]
appropriately viewed in part as anti-poverty initiatives."8 Access to
housing was also targeted in the Fair Housing Act of 1968,83 which
"expressly prohibited racial or religious discrimination by
governmental or most private owners of multi-family housing, in the

74 See Peter B. Edelman, Towarda ComprehensiveAntipoverty Strategy: Getting
Beyond the Silver Bullet, 81 GEO. L.J. 1697 (1993) (citing BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COM., SER. P-60, NO. 181, POVERTY IN THE
UNITED STATES: 1991 at 1 (1992)).
75
See id. The Bureau of the Census uses the term "Hispanic," which is
considered offensive by some groups because it refers to the Spanish conquerors
who killed and enslaved many groups of native people. Accordingly, we have
replaced it with the more widely accepted "Latino."
76 See id. at 1698.

77 See id.
78 42 U.S.C.A.. 2701 (1964) (repealed 1981).
79 Edelman, supranote 74, at 1710.
'0 42 U.S.C.A.. 2000e (1964).

"l 42 U.S.C.A. 1793 (1965).
82 Edelman, supranote 74, at 1710.
83 42 U.S.C.A. 3601 (1968).
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sale or rental of dwellings, or in their
advertisement, their financing,
84
brokerage."
or their commercial
Since then, it seems, the trend has been to move away from
race conscious antipoverty strategies. The strategy of the ReaganBush era embraced what might be called a pathology theory of
poverty, characterized by an insistence that the problem is the poor
themselves: "[t]alking about the adult, nonelderly, nondisabled,
nonemployed poor, this story says that they prefer to be dependent,
will not work unless coerced, and have bad morals; government
programs to help them just make them worse, cementing them in their
dependency with its associated depravity., 8 5 This story of poverty
relies on the assumption that poor people could pull themselves out of
poverty, if they would only choose to; if they choose not to, they have
only themselves to blame. The pathology story of poverty views
poverty as the "aggregation of separate personal cases arising through
86
deficits in individuals' capacity, circumstance, or character."
Whereas the pathology story of poverty "blames" poverty on
individual failures or tragedies, it does not consider the effect of race,
gender, or other structural or institutional factors. An alternative to
the pathology story of poverty is the structural story, which "looks to
the state of the economy, the state of opportunity, and the state of
education, and it sees racial and ethnic discrimination as a real part of
the picture as well. 87 This view locates the root causes of poverty in
a larger framework, rather than focusing on individual cases,
allowing for a broader understanding of the forces such as race and
gender that contribute to persistent poverty. A structural story of
poverty is more consistent with a Race Consciousness Model oflegal
services practice, in which the intersection of race and poverty may
be explicitly considered.88
Race and poverty also intersect to affect access to legal
services; poor people of color are "disproportionately numbered
among those without access to effective legal representation."89 Even
84

Boger, supranote 73, at 1306.

85 See Edelnan, supranote 74, at 1700.
86 Barbara Bezdek, Silence in the Court: ParticipationandSubordinationofPoor
Tenants' Voices in Legal Process, 20 HOFSTRA L. REv. 533, 537 (1993).
87 Edelnan, supranote 74, at 1701.
88 See infra Part III.A.
89 Symposium on RacialBias in the JudicialSystem: MinnesotaSupreme Court
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when poor clients of color represent themselves, they are not
guaranteed "access" to legal processes. The notion that one has
access to justice simply by getting into court is not bome out by the
experiences of people of color, particularly poor people of color.
People of color are routinely demeaned and discriminated 9against
in
0
the very courtrooms where they have gone to seek justice.
In a study of Baltimore's rent court, Barbara Bezdek found
that poor tenants of color are routinely treated less well than the
predominant17 white landlords and their agents, and rarely prevail on
their claims. Because most of these tenants are relatively unskilled
in the language of the law, which "bears little or no relation to
people's natural narratives," 92 judges tend not to give credence to
tenants' stories, and express impatience when tenants attempt to state
their claims. In this setting, tenants are excluded from "meaningful
participation in the conversation [making] the legal process a
charade." 93 This mistreatment only further entrenches the feeling for
poor people of color that the courts are hostile places which are not to
be trusted.9 4 It also fails to take into account that the law's power and
95
authority exist in connection with other power structures in society.

Task Force on Racial Bias in the JudicialSystem--Access to Representation and
Interaction, and General Civil Process, 16 HAMLINE L. REv. 665 (1993)
[hereinafterSymposium on Racial Bias).
90 See, e.g, 1991 REPORT OF THE NEW YORK STATE JUDICIAL COMMISSION ON
MINORrrIES 27 (finding that minority litigants perceive the courtroom environment
to be hostile and nearly half of all the minority litigants surveyed reported instances
of insensitive or otherwise unfair treatment).
91 See generally Bezdek, supranote 86.
92 Id. at 588.
9' Id. at 589.
94 See Symposium on Racial Bias, supranote 89, at 666; see also Bezdek, supra

note 86, at 589.
This is destructive of more than tenants' statutory rights. For most tenants,
such a court offers a stem lesson that formal rights are for somebody else
and not for them. Judicial manipulation of the hearing's discourse signals
official priorities about the rights to be protected and the language to
speak. Nothing in it encourages belief in a system of legal rights, nor an
expectation that legal rights parallel one's intuitive sense of rightness, nor
a perception of oneself as a rights-bearing person.

Id
95 See Bezdek, supra note 86, at 539.
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Despite the race conscious history of many past anti-poverty
programs in the United States, and statistics which show that people
of color continue to be disproportionately affected by poverty, many
offices providing legal services to the poor do not address the
connection between race and poverty. This is particularly curious,
given that neighborhood legal services, now the Legal Services
Corporation, grew out of the "War on Poverty."
The Lees argue that legal services attorneys rarely raise issues
of racial discrimination in the areas in which they generally practice,
such as housing, employment, education and government benefits:
Civil rights claims are rarely raised in these areas despite the
fact that legal services clients are almost always members of
groups that have been afforded special protection from
unequal treatment--people of color, women, children, seniors
and the disabled. As a result, discrimination, inequitable
distribution of resources, language access, and institutional
racism in benefit and entitlement programs go unchallenged.96
The Lees credit this failure of legal services organizations to act on
this link between race and poverty to "nonminority members of the
legal services community, especially those in legal services
leadership, [who] have gained self-esteem by looking down upon
their poor clients of color." 97 In the Lees' view, because most
managers of legal services offices are white, the policy set by
management does not adequately reflect 98
the needs of their clients,
color.
of
people
overwhelmingly
who are
The Lees argue that it is in the interests of the white
management to continue to advocate ineffectually: the white
management structure depends on "keeping its overwhelmingly
minority clients where they are both socially and economically,
whatever the cost." 99 Consequently, "there exists within legal
services no real institutional tolerance of strategies that would
actually result in increased participation by and empowerment of
96

Lee & Lee, supranote 71, at 312.

97

id

9' Id. at317.
99 Id.at312.
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poor clients even though a number of legal requirements and moral
imperatives for such activity exist."' 00 In their view, white managers
suffer from unacknowledged "empowerment phobia": they are afraid
to share their power with people of color, whether0 they be attorneys
or staff persons, community members, or clients.' '
The Lees argue that the only way to improve representation of
poor clients, particularly poor clients of color, is to increase the
number of attorneys of color working to deliver legal services to the
poor. The Lees state that "[p]eople of color have a strong desire to
have policymaking decisions about essential services provided to
them by people who look and talk like them--people they perceive to
be capable of identifying
with their culture and empathizing with
102
their concems."'
The Lees raise many complex questions: Do clients feel more
comfortable with attorneys who "look like them?" Are attorneys of
color more effective advocates for poor clients, who are
disproportionately of color? Are white attorneys reluctant to share
power? Are white attorneys even aware that they have greater power
by virtue of being white? These are some of the questions we have
attempted to answer through our survey of Legal Aid attorneys.
B.

Survey and Methodology

For this paper, we attempted to survey all staff and managing
attorneys within the Civil Division of the Legal Aid Society of the
City of New York. We collected information using both personal
interviews and a written survey.
First, we set out to interview twelve (12) attorneys,
administering in person a draft of the survey questions we created.
We tried as best we could to match the races and genders of the
attorney and interviewer: female attorneys of color were interviewed
by a woman of color; male attorneys of color were interviewed by a
man of color; white female attorneys were interviewed by a white
woman; and white male attorneys were interviewed by a white man.

100 Id. at313.
101 Lee & Lee, supranote71, at 316.
102 Id.
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Our original intent was to conduct these interviews as a way
to test and refine our survey before mailing it to the rest of the Civil
Division. Because of scheduling difficulties, only half ofthe personal
interviews took place before the survey was mailed to the larger
group. 10 3 However, we did receive suggestions for improving the.
and
survey from those attorneys we interviewed before the mailing,
10 4
clarifications.
and
changes
these
reflects
our revised survey
The personal interviews were tape recorded' 0 5 and later
transcribed on the survey forms for use in our calculations. Though
clearly the personal interviews were not conducted anonymously, all
material collected through the interviews has been incorporated and
cited anonymously.
In all, we sent out ninety-seven (97) written surveys,
accompanied by an introductory letter asking attorneys to assist us in
our project. The letter made clear that all survey results would be
To ensure this, we provided
confidential and anonymous.
respondents with a stamped, self-addressed envelope.
Our survey consisted of sixty-four (64) questions in six
categories: Personal Background; Client Composition; Office
and the Clients; Race of the Courts; and
Composition; Issues of10Race
6
Workplace Questions.
Our goal was to use this information to test the two competing
theories set out previously regarding the effects of race on attorney103

Additionally, due to time constraints and scheduling problems, only two (2)

female attorneys of color, and only two (2) white female attorneys were
interviewed in person.
104 For example, attorneys commented on questions they found vague, confusing,
or offensive. While the survey questions were revised repeatedly in an attempt to
avoid ambiguity, the authors acknowledge that some of the survey questions are

subject to different interpretations. For example, Question 41 of the survey asks:
Do you take the race of a client into consideration? The word "consideration" can
have different meanings to different attorneys and may affect their answers.

Likewise, Question 43 asks: Do you believe that race is an issue in your
representation ofyour client? Again, the word "issue" will mean different things to
different attorneys and will probably affect their responses. Although various
words used in the survey are subject to different interpretations, the authors believe

that the subtle differences in the meanings of various words did not significantly
impact or skew the results of their survey.
105 All but one of the attorneys allowed us to tape record the interviews.
106 See attached survey.
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client relationships. We set out to attempt to determine whether the
Neutrality Model, in which race does not matter and is not considered
(at least explicitly), or the Race Consciousness Model, in which race
matters a great deal and is actively considered, more readily explains
the perceptions of Legal Aid attorneys. The surveys also contained
questions designed to test the validity of some of the points made by
the Lees in their article.' 0 7 We chose to study the Civil Division
because we were interested in investigating attorney perceptions of
race in an environment where the clients are poor and generally of
color and the majority of the attorneys are white and more
economically privileged.
We received a total of sixty-four (64) usable survey
responses. 0 8 Of these sixty-four responses, twenty-four (24) were
from attorneys of color and forty (40) were from white attorneys.
The responses break down as follows:
Total women of Color:
Women of Color (Managers):
Women of Color (Staff):
Total men of Color:
Men of Color (Managers):
Men of Color (Staff):

15
0
15
9
2
7

TOTAL ATTORNEYS OF COLOR:

24

Total white women:

21

White women (Managers)
White women (Staff)

4
17

107 See infra Part IV.

108 A handful of attorneys sent back the surveys without answering the question
about their own race, making it impossible for us to evaluate the rest of their
responses. Additionally, not every responding attorney answered every question.
Thus, even among the sixty-four (64) surveys that we considered usable, not every
survey was usable for every question.
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Total White men:
White men (Managers)
White men (Staff)
TOTAL WHITE ATTORNEYS:

19
4
15
40
5]

[Unusable responses:
TOTAL USEABLE RESPONSES:

64

In examining our results, we chose to look at particular
questions, often in clusters, to contrast attorneys' perceptions of
themselves with attorneys' perceptions of clients and clients'
perceptions. Where there were patterns along gender lines or along
management or staff lines, we noted them as well. Because we are
not trained statisticians, we have not employed any statistical
analysis. Rather, we have analyzed the results anecdotally, and have
tried not to draw definitive conclusions. Wherever possible, we have
tried to offer as many alternative explanations as we could conceive
for the patterns we uncovered.
C.

Demographics of The Legal Aid Society's Civil
Division

these applicants
Our Society provides not alms, which
0
1
justice.
but
accept,
not
would
and
do not ask
During its one hundred year history, the Civil Division has
attempted to provide justice to approximately two million people in
need. Founded in 1876 by a group of attorneys and merchants,i1 the
Civil Division began as the "German Society," 1 a corporation
created to protect German immigrants. In the late 1800s, New York
City was being inundated by German immigrants, 1 2 many whom
110 See AUERBACH, supranote 3, at 53; TWEED, supranote 109.

1 The actual name of the "German Society" was Der Deutsche- RechtsschutaVerein. See AUERBACH, supranote 3, at 53.
In 1876 90,000 German immigrants, nearly 10% of the city's population,
112
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were being victimized by unscrupulous employers. The "German
Society" was created to give legal aid and assistance to that
vulnerable group. In 1889, the "German Society" amended its charter
and began to provide legal assistance to all groups of people, not just
those of German birth." 3 In 1896, the "German Society" officially
changed its name to The Legal Aid Society. 14 Since its official name
change, The Legal Aid Society has grown tremendously, and is now
comprised of six separate divisions: Civil Division, Criminal
Division, Criminal Appeals Bureau, Federal Defenders Division,
Juvenile Rights Division, and the Volunteer Division. In an effort to
keep our findings within manageable levels, our survey and study
was limited to the Civil Division.
The Civil Division is the largest provider of civil legal
services to the poor in New York City. In 1993, the Civil Division
assisted over 33,000 clients" l5 in its eight neighborhood offices,' 16 six
city-wide units, and special projects." 7 The Civil Division employs
124 attorneys, 50 paralegals and 107 support staff. Interestingly,
when the Civil Division was founded by a group of German lawyers
arrived in New York City. See TWEED, supranote 109, at 5.
113 See AUERBACH, supranote 3, at 53; TWEED, supranote 109, at 7.
114 See TWEED, supranote 109, at 7.
115 THE LEGAL AID SOCIETY, 1993 ANNUAL REPORT 14 (1993).
116 The neighborhood office is a key component of the Civil Division's structure.
Recognizing years ago that poor people were reluctant to travel outside their own
neighborhoods, the Civil Division established offices in depressed neighborhoods
throughout the City. See TWEED, supranote 109, at 20. Today, a staff attorney's
vantage point from a neighborhood office supposedly allows the attorney to see
clients on a daily basis and develop a sense of the community and its needs. See
Andrea J. Saltzman, PrivateBar Delivery of Civil Legal Services to the Poor: A
Designfor a CombinedPrivateAttorney andStaffed Office Delivery System, 34
HASTINGS L.J. 1165, 1171 (1983). Having developed a sense of the community
and its needs, the neighborhood office staff attorney is "more likely to devise
efficient and effective ways of dealing with or eliminating ... problems." Id. at
1170.
117 The Civil Division's eight neighborhood offices are: The Bronx Neighborhood
Office; The Brooklyn Neighborhood Office; The Harlem Neighborhood Office;
The Chelsea/Lower Westside Neighborhood Office; The RockawayNeighborhood
Office; The Queens Neighborhood Office; The Staten Island Neighborhood
Office; and The Brooklyn Office for the Aging. The six city-wide units and special
projects are: The Civil Appeals and Law Reform Unit; The Homeless Family
Rights Project; The Immigration Unit; The Family Law Unit; The Consumer Law
Special Project; and The Legislative and Administrative Advocacy Project.
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and merchants, their aim was to help other Germans, people who
looked like them and had similar ethnic and cultural backgrounds.
Today, Civil Division attorneys have few similarities with the clients
they serve. Although 90 percent of the Civil Division's clients are
people of color," 8 63 percent of the staff attorneys are white." 9
Among supervising attorneys the figure is even higher -- 77 percent
are white. 12 While female staff attorneys outnumber their male
counterparts by more than 2 to 1, males account for 62 percent of the
supervising attorney positions. 121
Among the Civil Division's attorneys of color, many different
ethnic groups are represented. 122 While most attorneys of color
identified themselves as being African-American or Latino/a, other
attorneys of color indicated that they were Asian, Euro-Asian, or
African. Interestingly, in one survey answer, a white attorney
objected to the ethnic category of "white" as "meaningless." The
attorney stated, "[i]f you think color is the issue (which I do not)
118 See THE AssOCIATION OF LEGAL AID ATTORNEYS OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK,

SECOND REPORT ON DISCRIMINATION AGAINST LEGAL AID SOCIETY CIVIL
DMsION ATTORNEYS AND JOB APPLICANTS BASED UPON RACE 1 (1992)
(hereinafter SECOND REPORT ON DISCRvINATION) (stating that at least 90% of the

Civil Division's clients are people of color).
119 See THE LEGAL AID SOCIETY, EEO REPORT (1995) (hereinafter EEO REPORT).

While the percentage of white Legal Aid staff attorneys appears high compared to
the percentage of clients of color, the percentage is actually a lot lower than that at
most major corporate law firms. A recent American Bar Association survey
revealed that 97 percent of all partners in major law firms are white. See MenkelMeadow, supranote 4, at 627. Likewise, whites account for over 90 percent of the
total bar membership. See id.; Affirmative Action on the Edge, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., Feb. 13, 1995, at 32, 37 (noting that whites account for over 94
percent of all admitted attorneys). Whites also account for approximately 84
percent of the law school enrollment. See Adams, supra note 5, at 2.
o See EEO REPORT, supra note 119. According to the Lees, it is the high
percentage ofwhite management attorneys that is responsible for the failure of legal
services organizations to adequately address the needs of their clients, who are
overwhelmingly people of color. See supraPart IV.A.
121 See EEO REPORT, supra note 119.

122 Within the survey attorneys were asked circle one of seven ethnic groups that
they identified with: White, White Latino/a, African-American, Black Latino/a,

Asian, Native American. We also provided an "Other" category which we left
blank and allowed attorneys to fill in. A small number of attorneys did use the

"Other" category: one attorney filled in the term "African"; another used the term
"Euro-Asian"; and a third filled in the blank with "Irish/German-American."
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please be uniform in the categories and assign a color to everyone."
This attorney went on to state that she is "not colorless" and "not
even white." The attorney then commented that if we were going to
use the category "African-American, thereby specifying a continent.
• why not European-American?"
In addition to being asked about their ethnic backgrounds, the
Civil Division attorneys were also asked about their sexual
orientation and age. Fifty percent of the responding attorneys
indicated that they fell into the age group of 30-39 years. Nearly one
third of the responding attorneys indicated that they were 20-29 years
old. While the vast majority of Civil Division attorneys appear to be
under the age of forty, there is tremendous age diversity within the
Civil Division. Six attorneys indicated that they were between the
ages of 40-49; one attorney indicated he was between 50-59 years
old; one attorney indicated that she was 60-69 years old; and two
attorneys indicated that they were over 69 years old. As with age,
there also appears to be sexual orientation diversity within the Civil
Division. While the majority of responding attorneys indicated that
they were heterosexual, others indicated that they were gay, lesbian
23
or bi-sexual.1
Another area attorneys were questioned about was their
economic backgrounds. Attorneys were asked to indicate the type of
economic background in which they were raised and the economic
group to which they now belong. The survey provided seven possible
answers: Wealthy; Upper Middle Class; Middle Class; Lower
Middle Class; Poor; Below Poverty; and Don't Know. According to
the survey answers, there does not appear to be any correlation
between race or ethnic background and current economic status
among Civil Division attorneys. Overwhelmingly, both white
attorneys and attorneys of color identified themselves as currently
being middle class. Among the responding white attorneys, 22 of the
Among the responding attorneys, three indicated that they were bi-sexual, two
indicated that they were lesbian, and two indicated that they were gay. The
information in this section regarding the age, sexual orientation, and economic
123

backgrounds of the attorneys is given to provide a more complete picture of the
people we were studying. Although we acknowledge that there are many factors
that go into how one person interacts with another, this paper is concerned with
race, and as such, we did not analyze the results with regard to other factors such as
age or sexual orientation.
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40 (55%) identified themselves as middle class. The percentage was
even higher among responding attorneys of color-- 17 of 24 (70%)
identified with the middle class group.
There does, however, appear to be a noticeable difference in
the types of economic backgrounds in which white attorneys and
attorneys of color were raised. Among both groups, most of the
attorneys indicated that they were raised in some type of "middle
class background."' 124 However, among white males, two attorneys
indicated that they came from wealthy economic backgrounds. This
was the only group that had responses in the "wealthy" category.
While white males were the only group to indicate that some of its
members were raised in wealthy environments, one white male did
indicate that he was raised in a poor economic environment. Among
white females, the responses were similar--only one attorney
indicated that she was raised in a "below poverty" economic
environment.
Overall, the percentage of white attorneys raised in "poor" or
"below poverty" economic environments was small, approximately 5
percent for both men and women.125 Among attorneys of color,
however, the percentage was much higher. Approximately 22
percent of male attorneys of color indicated that they were raised in
environments that were "poor" or "below poverty."'126 The
percentage was slightly less for women of color-- approximately 20
percent were
raised in environments classified as "poor" or "below
127
poverty.'

The term "middle class" here actually encompasses three different economic
groups: upper middle class, middle class and lower middle class. The actual
breakdown of the responses is as follows: white males (7 middle class, 5upper
124

middle class, 4 lower middle class, 2 wealthy and 1 poor); white females (10
middle class, 6 upper middle class, 3 lower middle class, and 1 below poverty);
females of color (5lower middle class, 3 poor, 2 upper middle class, 2 middle class,

1below poverty); males of color (4 middle class, 2 lower middle class, 1 upper
middle class, 1 poor, and 1 below poverty).

Among the eighteen responding white males, one indicated that he was raised
in a poor economic environment. Likewise, only one of the twenty responding
white women indicated that she was raised in an environment below poverty.
126
Of the nine responding male attorneys of color, one indicated that he was
raised in a poor economic environment and one indicated below poverty.
127 A total of fifteen women responded. Three indicated that they were raised in
poor economic environments and one indicated below poverty.
125
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But while many attorneys of color and white attorneys appear
to have been raised in much different economic environments, their
reasons for entering low-paying legal services positions 128 are
basically the same. When asked to indicate what influenced their
decision to enter public interest/legal services work, most attorneys
indicated a "desire to help others."' 129 The difference between the two
groups of attorneys was not great-55 percent for white attorneys
compared to 47 percent for attorneys of color.
While the statistical difference between the two groups was
not great, the answers of the attorneys of color were difficult to
interpret. Since a sizable percentage of attorneys of color were raised
in poor or below poverty environments, it was anticipated that many
of them would indicate other reasons for entering legal services such
as "desire to better my community" or "relate to clients due to
personal experience." Although some attorneys of color did indicate
those answers, so did white attorneys. The most frequently given
answer by attorneys of color, "desire to help others," could indicate
that the responding attorneys do not think of themselves as a "part" of
the group of people they are helping.
An additional noteworthy finding was made when analyzing
the reasons why the responding attorneys entered legal services. Two
attorneys of color, one male and one female, indicated that they
entered public interest/legal services because no other jobs were
available. The fact that two attorneys of color, but no white
attorneys, gave this answer, even though sixteen more white attorneys
answered the survey than attorneys of color, could be indicative of
racism in large corporate firms. It is well known that not only are
minorities grossly under-represented in the legal profession as a
whole, but their numbers are especially lagging in large corporate law
firms. In New York State, for example, minorities account for 25
percent of the state's population, but only 4 percent of all registered
128 The starting annual salary for a first year attorney at The Legal Aid Society is
$31,000, as opposed to $83,000 at any large New York City firm.
129 "Desire to help others" was one of the eleven choices offered. The others
reasons offered were: past work or volunteer experience; desire to better my

community; upbringing; saw the need; law school experience; most needy
clientele; relate to clients due to personal experience; opportunity for hands on
training/court experience; exciting areas of the law; and no other available jobs.
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attorneys. 130 Among large corporate law firms, the numbers are even
more alarming: a 1989 survey 3found only 70 minority partners out of
a total of 4,086 (1.7 percent).1 '
Not only has the Civil Division substantially increased its
workforce and the number of cases it handles since its inception in
1876, it has also diversified its practice. While the Civil Division still
assists immigrants against unscrupulous employers, it has expanded
its practice and now assists clients in areas such as housing,
government benefits, disability, health care, homelessness, elder law,
family law, guardianship, bankruptcy, wills, consumer fraud, and
education.
D.
1.

Individual Question Analysis

Issues of Race and the Clients
Question 41: Do you take the race of a client into
consideration?
Answer Yes or No.
Question 42: Do you believe your clients take the race of
their attorney into consideration?
Answer Yes or No.

A majority of all attorneys, both white attorneys' 32 and
attorneys of color, 133 answered "no" to question 41, indicating that
they did not take the race of their clients into consideration.
However, only a majority (64%) of white males answered "no" to
indicating that they do not believe that their clients
question 42,
take the race of their attorney into account. In contrast, most women
of color, men of color, and white women answered "yes" to question
130

See NEW YORK STATE JUDICIAL COMMISSION ON MINORITIES, EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY REPORT 81-82 (1991).
131 See id.
Eighty-four percent (32 of 38 usable responses) of the responding white
132

attorneys answered no.

Seventy-eight percent (18 of23 usable responses) of the responding attorneys
of color answered no.
134 Eleven of 17 usable responses.
133
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42, indicating that they do believe that their clients take the race of
their attorney into account.
Within this pair of questions, only white males appear to be
operating under the Neutrality Model. There are several ways to
explain the responses of the remaining groups. Answering that they
do not take race into consideration could be a result of professional
identification, since many comments echo Levinson's theories of
neutrality. For example, one woman, who characterized herself as
Black Latina, commented, "I try to advocate zealously on behalf of
all my clients."',3 5 A white woman during a face-to-face interview
she notices race but does not take it into
commented that
36
1
consideration.
Significantly, no attorneys adhered to an absolute Race
Consciousness Model in this set of questions. Perhaps attorneys of
color do not take race into account, given that they are in large part
serving clients of color. In the same way that whites in the larger
culture are not forced to examine their whiteness, 137 it is possible that
attorneys of color in an environment where clients are
overwhelmingly of color do not feel the need to focus on this issue.
In terms of question 42, groups other than white males may
have answered "yes" for different reasons. Some may feel that
clients prefer to work with attorneys ofthe same race. For example, a
Latina woman commented, "I believe that clients feel more
comfortable with individuals 'like them."'138 Additionally, a Latino
male wrote, "I sense a certain degree of apprehension and confusion
when the attorney of record lacks the necessary sensitivity with
minority clients. Those clients see the attorney.., as just one more
An Africanpeg in the white machinery of government."' 139
American man stated that clients often make assumptions about the
ability of their lawyer to identify with their concerns based on
whether or not their attorney is of the same race. 140 This could
indicate a half-hearted adherence to the Race Consciousness Model,
135 Survery #2 (Survey responses are on file with authors.).
136Survey #26.
137 See supranotes 43-46 and accompanying text.
138 Survey #15
139Survey #11.
140 Survey #44.
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or an adherence to the Neutrality Model's concept of a distinct
professional identity.
Interestingly, some attorneys of color, in answering question
42, noted that many of their clients of color actually preferred
attorneys who embodied the clients' stereotype of what lawyers
should be. One African woman stated "clients must take the race of
their attorney into consideration since when it comes to lawyers
society thinks Jewish is better."' 141 An African-American man wrote
that "sometimes clients come to142the office openly stating that they
want a (white) Jewish attorney."'
Several responses indicated possible problems with the way
both questions were framed. Some attorneys answered the question
in terms of whether or not race was a factor in how they formulated
courtroom strategy for a particular client. For example, an AfricanAmerican man wrote, "The client's race affects representation to the
extent that the institutions and people we deal with view our clients
differently because oftheir race .... [P]roper representation requires
recognition of the challenges our clients are facing, and developing
strategies with awareness of those biases.' 143 Others may have
responded to this question in terms of which clients' cases are taken.
For example, a white female commented "office policy is to reach
those individuals least represented. We therefore
make an extra
144
effort to reach out to the communities of color."'
Additionally, one white woman answered question 42 by
145
stating "clients do not get to choose who represents them."'
Another white woman attorney stated that "our clients are 'assigned'
to an attorney and have no input into selectiig
us. To that extent, our
146
clients cannot take race into account."'
Question 43: Do you believe that race is an issue in your
representation of your client?
Answers on a scale of 1 ("No") to 5 ("Yes").
141 Survey #4.
142

Survey #14.

This lawyer also noted that -there are other clients who

sf ecifically request "a black attorney."
Survey #14.

'"

145
146

Survey #54.
Survey #52.
Survey #53.
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For purposes of tabulation, answers of "1" or "2" were
counted as "No" responses; "3" was considered neutral or no
response; and answers of "4" or "5" were counted as "Yes"
responses.
The results for this question for white males were
demographically similar to the results for questions 41 and 42. A
majority of white males (57%)147 responded that race is not an issue,
consistent with the Neutrality Model. The responses of white women
differed from their male counterparts. Only 43%148 indicated that
race was not an issue in the representation of clients. It should be
noted that six of the twenty-one responding white women indicated
that race was Dsomewhat[l of an issue in the representation of
clients. To maintain consistency in our polling methods, the authors
considered all "3" responses as neutral and did not use them in the
calculations. However, this term may have misled some of the
responding attorneys and unfairly skewed the results of this question.
The responses of women of color were divided equally on this
question: 5 women responded that race was not an issue and 5women
indicated that race was an issue. The remaining 5 women chose the
neutral response, which was not counted in our survey. Based on the
even split among women of color, it is difficult to categorize their
responses as adhering to either model.
The responses of men of color were surprising. It was
expected that men of color would align with the Race Consciousness
Model. That was not the case however. Forty-four percent of men of
49
color stated that race was an issue in the representation of clients.
However, one-third of the men of color stated that race was not an
issue. 150 While the responses of the men of color lean more towards
the Race Consciousness Model, the results are difficult to categorize
and do not clearly align with either model.
One interesting comment came from a male attorney who
characterized himself as Black Latino. He commented that "[r]ace is
147 Eleven of 19 responses.
148 Nine of 21 usable responses.

149 Four of 9 responses.
150 Three of 9 responses.
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always an issue,151if not to me, [then] to the courts, this office, the
outside world."'
Question 44: Do you believe your race has an effect on how
you represent your clients?
Answers on a scale of 1 ("Negative") to 5("Positive"), with 3
being "None" or no effect.
Under a Race Consciousness approach, the answer to this
question would depend on the race of the attorney. A white attorney
would be expected to respond that her race might have a negative
effect on her representation of people of color. She might believe
that the racial differences between her and her clients would impede
communication, making representation more problematic. An
attorney of color, on the other hand, might feel that his race is a
positive factor in representation, insofar as it may contribute to
greater mutual understanding. Obviously, attorneys who follow the
Neutrality Model should respond that their race has no effect on
representation.
While the responses of white women to the questions
discussed above were similar to their attorney of color counterparts,
in this question, the majority (64%)152 of white women and white
men answered that their race had no effect on how they represent
their clients. This may be attributable to the notion that, even where
white women can acknowledge the existence of issues in regards to
race, they may not be comfortable acknowledging that these issues
actually affect the quality of their work.
In contrast, the majority (59%)153 of all people of color
believed that their race had a positive effect, indicating that they felt
that the race-based commonality they have with their clients
facilitates representation of those clients. This is in line with the
Race Consciousness Model, where shared racial identity factors help
to foster more meaningful communication.
Question #47: I prefer clients of the same race as me.
151 Survey #9.
152 Twenty-two of 34 usable responses.
153 Thirteen of 22 usable responses.
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Answers on a scale of 1(disagree) to 5(agree).
Question #48: I believe that clients prefer attorneys of the
same race as they are.
Answers on a scale of l(disagree) to 5(agree).
For purposes of tabulation for both of the above questions,
answers of "1" or "2" were counted as "No" responses;
answers of "3" were counted as neutral or no response; and
answers of "4" or "5" were counted as "Yes" responses.
Question 47, because it asks for an attorney's racial
preference, could be construed as asking the attorney to state that he
or she is racist. As noted above, though, Race Consciousness should
not be equated with actually preferring people of the same race.
Because of this difficulty, we did not expect more than a handful of
positive responses to question 47. Instead, the question was intended
as a foil, to provide the respondents with an opportunity to state up
front that they were not racists, ideally allowing them to respond
more honestly to question 48.
As expected, an overwhelming majority (50 of 62 usable
responses--81%) of all responding attorneys disagreed with the
statement in question 47. Among the white attorneys, 92 percent (37
of 40 responses) disagreed with the statement in question 47. The
percentage was lower for attorneys of color--59 percent (13 of 22
usable responses) of the responding attorneys disagreed with the
statement in question 47.
A majority of white attorneys (71%--23 of 32 usable
responses) stated that they disagreed with the statement in question
48, indicating that they believed that clients did not prefer attorneys
of the same race. The answers of the white attorneys fall squarely
within the Neutrality Model and indicate that, as a group, white
attorneys believe that race does not play a part in the attorney-client
relationship. The few comments from the white attorneys seem to
indicate a belief in the Neutrality Model's idea of a professional
identity. For example, one white male attorney wrote, "Clients just
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want an attomey."' 154 Another commented that "Clients just155want
competent attorneys who are sympathetic to their problems."'
Particularly interesting, given the similarity of questions 47
and 48 to questions 41 and 42, were the answers of white women. As
noted in the discussion on questions 41 and 42, white women
followed the answer pattern of attorneys of color. 156 Here, however,
white women answered in line with their male counterparts. The
issue may again be one of degree. In the earlier questions, attorneys
were asked only whether race was an issue, which many white
women may have felt comfortable acknowledging. Here, they are
asked to assess whether or not the issue rises to a level such that it is
actually an impairment of the attorney-client relationship. Perhaps,
not surprisingly, fewer are willing to admit that race would play such
a large role.
The responses of the attorneys of color to question 48 are
more difficult to interpret. Unlike their white counterparts, only 31
percent (7 of 22 usable responses) of attorneys of color disagreed
with the statement in question 48. Yet, only 41 percent (9 of 22
usable responses) of attorneys of color agreed with the statement.
Further examination of the responses of attorneys of color reveals a
split among the sexes.
A majority of men of color (55% - 5 of 9 responses) agreed
with the statement in question 48, indicating adherence to the Race
Consciousness Model. Women ofcolor, however, were split amongst
their ranks. Thirty-eight percent (5 of 13 useable responses) of the
women disagreed with the statement in question 48, while a
somewhat smaller percentage of the women agreed with the
statement (31%-4 of 13 usable responses). The split among women
of color to question 48 may indicate the group's limited belief in both
the Race Consciousness Model and the Neutrality Model.

154 Survey response #38.
155 Survey response #30.
156 One possible explanation

for why the answers of white women have followed
the patterns of attorneys of color is that women, who themselves are frequently the
victims of discrimination and harassment, may be more aware because of personal
experiences of personal identity factors and how those differences translate into
differential treatment.
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Question #49: Clients are more open with attorneys of the
same race as them.
Answers on a scale of 1(disagree) to 5(agree).
For tabulation purposes, answers of "1" and "2" were
considered as disagreeing with the question; "3" was
considered as neutral or no response; and answers of"4" and
"5" were considered as agreeing with the question.
Communication is probably the most important part of the
attorney-client relationship. 157 In order for an attorney to effectively
advocate for her client, she must first establish a relationship with that
client, and she must obtain the necessary information.
Communication is also the area where race may play the most
important role in the attorney-client relationship. As client and
attorney comfort levels go up, one would presume that
communication becomes more productive and representation
becomes more effective.
A majority of people of color (57%-12 of 21 useable
responses) agreed with the statement, indicating an adherence to the
Race Consciousness Model. There was little difference between men
and women of color in response to this question, as a majority of both
groups agreed with the statement in question 49. Men of color may
have exhibited a stronger adherence to the Race Consciousness
Model, since not a single male disagreed with the statement in
question 49, while two women of color disagreed with the statement.
Not even a majority of white attorneys (41%-12 or 29 useable
responses) disagreed with the statementin question 49, indicating that
even those who earlier did not acknowledge race as an issue now
seem to believe that people of color are more open with attorneys of
color. These responses are the most difficult to explain. The white
157 Communication is so vital to the attorney-client relationship that it forms the
basis of the legal profession's oldest and most important common law privilege, the
attorney-client privilege. As the Supreme Court noted in Upjohn v. United States,

449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981), "The lawyer-client privilege rests on the need for the
advocate and counselor to know all that relates to the client's reasons for seeking
representation .... ." It was further noted that communication forms the basis of the
privilege because it "encourage[s] clients to make full disclosures to their
attorneys." Id.
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attorneys' responses to this statement may illustrate a general lack of
concentration on the dynamics of attorney-client communication. For
a white attorney to implicitly acknowledge that a client of color is
more open with an attorney of color, but not to acknowledge that race
is an issue, seems contradictory. Possibly the white attorneys are in
positions with little client contact, so that even though people of color
are less open with them, this is irrelevant to their effectiveness as a
lawyer or to how they approach representation. For example, some
may regard eviction prevention law as merely filling out forms and
arguing before courts, and may therefore place little emphasis on
dealing with the client herself. Alternatively, white attorneys may
believe that although people of color are less open with them, they
are open enough to ensure effective representation.
This question presents one of the more racially explicit
queries in the survey, and as such we might expect people to answer
with some hesitancy. This may explain why it is difficult to discern
any pattern in the responses of white attorneys. As stated earlier,
even attorneys willing to state that race is an issue might be less
likely to admit that it has a concrete effect on the quality of
representation they provide to their clients.
Question #50: I believe that attorneys of color are more
effective representatives of people of color.
Answers on a scale of l (disagree) to 5(agree).
For tabulation purposes, answers of "1" and "2" were
considered as disagreeing with the question; "3" was
considered as neutral or no response; and answers of"4" and
"5" were considered as agreeing with the question.
This question is clearly the most explicit in addressing the
issue of the impact of race on the attorney-client relationship. With
this statement, the issue of race is no longer an abstract construct that
an attorney can acknowledge without implicating his or her own
effectiveness or competence. For white Legal Aid attorneys to agree
with this statement is to acknowledge that they are potentially
handicapped in their effectiveness as representatives of people of
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color. For attorneys of color to agree with this statement is for them
to state they are better at what they do because of their race.
The answers to this question were clearly divided along racial
lines. White attorneys overwhelmingly disagreed: Seventy-three
percent (27 out of 37 useable responses) answered either "1" or "2."
The answers among white men and white women were similar: 75
percent (12 of 18 useable responses) of white women disagreed with
this question, while 79 percent (15 of 19 useable responses) of white
men disagreed.
Whether this is the result of adherence to the Neutrality Model
or adherence to their own self-interest is hard to determine. It would
be difficult to imagine that most white attorneys would be willing to
agree with the idea that they, by virtue of their race, are simply less
effective advocates of people of color. It would be tantamount to a
call to replace them with attorneys of color.
One white male attorney responded, "[a]bsolutely not-a
quality lawyer can effectively advocate for their client regardless of
color." 158 Similarly, another white male attorney wrote, "in most
individual instances the individual skill of an attorney obviously
A white
determines the effectiveness of the representation."' '
female attorney echoed these remarks, commenting that "[w]hat
makes a good attorney is commitment, openness, and a willingness to
listen. That's not tied to race."' 60 Another white female attorney
stated that the effectiveness of the representation is not related to the
race of the attorney. The attorney noted that a person of color may
but that doesn't
feel more comfortable with an attorney of16color,
1
translate into more effective representation.
The answers of attorneys of color to this question were much
different than their white counterparts. Only 42% (10 of 24
responses) of attorneys of color disagreed with this question. This
lower percentage, compared to their white counterparts, results from
a marked difference in opinion among men of color and women of
color. Forty-seven percent of women of color disagreed with this
question. Yet, only 20% of women of color agreed with this
158 Survey response #56.
159 Survey response # 37.

160 Survey response #55.
161 Survey response #26.
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question. Conversely, only 33% percent (3 of 9 responses) of men of
color expressed disagreement to this question, while 55% (5 of 9
responses) of the men agreed that attorneys of color are more
effective representatives of people of color.
Here, it appears that the answers of the white attorneys, both
men and women, can be explained by the Neutrality Model, while the
answers of the men of color clearly adhere to the Race Consciousness
Model. The answers of the women of color, however, are more
difficult to interpret. Although it could be argued that answers of
women of color to this question align closer to the Neutrality Model
than the Race Consciousness Model, since 47 percent of the women
indicated their disagreement, it is difficult to draw any conclusions
since five of the women answered "3," which is considered a neutral
response for control purposes.
Question #39: In general, I have good relationships with my
clients.
Answers on a scale of l(disagree) to 5(agree).
Question #40: In general, my colleagues have good
relationships with their clients.
Answers on a scale of 1(disagree) to 5(agree).
For tabulation purposes, answers of "1" and "2" were
considered as disagreeing with the question; "3" was
considered as neutral or no response; and answers of"4" and
"5" were considered as agreeing with the question.
These questions are related to questions 43 and 50. In
question 43, we asked whether attorneys believed that race was an
issue in their representation of clients. In response to this question,
the two groups of attorneys divided along racial lines. In adhering to
the Neutrality Model, the majority (55%) of white attorneys said "no"
to question 43, indicating that race was not an issue. Attorneys of
color, consistent with the Race Consciousness Model, took the
opposite view. Sixty-six percent of attorneys of color indicated that
race was an issue in their representation of a client.
In question 50, we asked the surveyed lawyers whether they
believed that attorneys of color were more effective representatives of
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people of color. As with question 43, the answers to question 50
often differed according to the race of the responding attorney.
Whites overwhelmingly (73 %) stated that attorneys of color were not
more effective representatives of people of color. A much smaller
percentage (42%) of people of color disagreed in question 50.
Interestingly, only 33 percent of attorneys of color indicated that they
were more effective representatives of people of color. The answers
of attorneys of color differed sharply according to the sex of the
responding attorney. While only 20 percent of women of color
agreed with the statement in question 50, a majority (55%) ofthe men
of color agreed that attorneys of color were more effective
representatives of people of color.
Remembering that 90 percent of the Civil Division's clients
are people of color, 162 the answers to questions 39 and 40 should
differ depending on the race of the attorney, according to the Race
Consciousness Model. Since the majority of white attorneys
indicated earlier that race is not an issue in the representation of
clients and that attorneys of color are not more effective
representatives ofpeople of color, white attorneys would be expected
to agree with both questions 39 and 40.
Under the Neutrality Model, since race is irrelevant, white
attorneys adhering to this model would assume that their relationships
with their clients are as good as their attorney of color counterparts.
Indeed, that was the case. Ninety-two percent of white attorneys
stated that they had good relationships with their clients of color. A
somewhat smaller percentage, eighty-seven percent, agreed that their
colleagues also have good relationships with their clients. Because
question 40 did not ask whether their colleagues of color have good
relationships with their clients, it is difficult to draw a conclusion
from the answers of the white attorneys to this question. We can
conclude, however, based on the large majority of white attorneys
(92%) that agreed with question 39, that white attorneys believe that
their relationships with their clients, who are mostly people of color,
are as good as those of any other attorneys in the Civil Division,
regardless of the attorney's race.
Although the majority of white attorneys clearly aligned with
the Neutrality Model in responding to questions 39 and 40, the
162

See supranote 118 and accompanying text.
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answers of the attorneys of color differed from their white
counterparts. Since race is an issue in client representation under the
Race Consciousness Model, one would think that a greater percentage
of attorneys of color, as opposed to white attorneys, would agree that
they have good relationships with their clients, who are primarily
people of color. Such was not the case. Surprisingly, a smaller
majority (83%) of attorneys of color indicated that they have good
relationships with their clients. Of course, the answers of both white
attorneys and attorneys of color to question 39 could be motivated by
personal interest and have nothing to do with race. It would seem
that most attorneys, regardless of race, believe that they possess the
requisite skills and professionalism to maintain good relationships
with their clients.
In response to question 40, the answers of attorneys of color
differed more significantly than their white counterparts. Although a
majority of attorneys of color (62%-15 of 24 responses) indicated that
their colleagues have good relationships with their clients, this
percentage was significantly lower than their white counterparts.
Under the Race Consciousness Model, attorneys of color would be
aware of their client's race and would supposedly be able to put the
client more at ease, understand the client better, and interpret
unspoken cues. Of course, while the Race Consciousness Model is
used to explain the attorney's behavior, the client cannot be ignored.
Clients may indeed feel more at ease and thus be more open with
attorneys that look like them and may have similar backgrounds. If
so, this would also foster a "better" relationship among the client and
attorney. But, while the responses of attorneys of color to question 40
may have shifted more towards the Race Consciousness Model, as a
whole their responses are best explained by the Neutrality Model.
There is a possible explanation for the answers of attorneys of
color to question 40. Attorneys of color may be exhibiting their
"professional identities" in responding to questions 39 and 40.163
Such a conclusion would comport with Levinson's assumption that
the rigorous training of law school "bleach[es] out [the] aspects of
self" 4 such that "race, gender, religion, or ethnic background

163
164

See supraPart II.C.
Levinson, supra note 26, at 1578. See also supra Part II.C.
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become irrelevant to defining one's capabilities as a lawyer."' 165 But
while the "professional identity" explanation is plausible, it does not
adequately account for or explain the earlier responses of male
attorneys of color to question 50 that corresponded with the Race
Consciousness Model.
B.

Community Involvement

Question #30: What sort of impact do you believe your office
has on the community?
Answer on a scale of 1 (negative) to 5 (positive) with 3 being
no effect.
This question was designed to gauge whether attorneys of
color and white attorneys had the same evaluation of the significance
of their work in the community. If the Race Consciousness Model,
with its emphasis on the increased ability of attorneys of color to
communicate with people of color, and thus with the community,
held true, then we would expect there to be a discrepancy between the
answers of attorneys of color and white attorneys. One could expect,
for example, attorneys who are less knowledgeable about the lives
and struggles of their clients to overestimate the impact that their
office has on the community it serves.
Another important aspect of this question is that it directly
tests the criticisms leveled by the Lees in their article. 166 According
to the Lees, the policies pursued by legal services offices are largely
the product of white attorneys and managers who have little
connection or concern for the real problems faced by the communities
of color they serve. If this were the case, we would expect attorneys
of color, perhaps, to perceive that their office has only a minimal
effect on the community. White attorneys, who arguably operate
from the same perspective as the policy makers, would believe that
the organization's impact is greater.
The responses that we received, though, did not vary
significantly according to race. 167 Across the board, attorneys
165 Levinson, supranote 26, at 1579. See also supra Part II.C.
166 See supra Part IV.A.
167 Additionally, the results did not vary across management/staff
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answered that their offices had a significant positive impact on the
community.
Question #36: How responsive is your office to the desires of
the community?
Answers on a scale of 1 (not responsive) to 5 (very
responsive)
As with the previous question, question 36 was designed to
determine whether attorneys of color and white attorneys sensed a
different level of community involvement. Additionally, as with
question 30, this question tests the Lees' hypothesis that offices
advocating on behalf of poor clients of color set their agendas without
regard to the actual needs and desires of the communities themselves.
Although the responses were not as positive as the responses
to question 30, a clear majority of all races and genders believed that
their offices are fairly responsive to the desires of the community.
Only seventeen of fifty-eight attorneys responding to this question
answered that their offices were not responsive to the community.
Six of twenty attorneys of color answered negatively, and eleven of
thirty-eight white attorneys answered negatively.
Again, the responses to both questions 30 and 36 seem to
argue against the theories advanced by the Lees.
C.

Race and The Courts

Question #51: Do you believe your client's race has an effect
on the treatment your client receives in court?
.Answers on a scale of 1 (negative effect) to 5 (positive effect)
with 3 being no effect.
For tabulation purposes, answers of"l" and "2" were counted
as a negative effect; "3" was counted no effect; and answers
of "4" and "5"were counted as a positive effect.
lines.
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According to the Rule of Law, 168 a client's race should have
no effect on the treatment that she receives from the court. Given the
overwhelming statistics on the demographics of poverty,' 69 it would
be hard to imagine even the strictest adherent to the Neutrality Model
answering that race had no effect on the treatment that people of color
receive in court. Not surprisingly, the responses were heavily skewed
in the negative. For whites, seventy-one percent (25 of 35 useable
responses) answered that they believed that their client's race had a
negative effect on their treatment by the courts. One white attorney,
who responded that her clients' race had a negative effect, noted that
her clients "are seen as interchangeable. Outright racism is rare, but
the undercurrent pervades the system."' 170 Another white attorney
commented that "[m]ostjudges, who are white, are condescending to
clients of color."' 7' Finally, a white attorney put his observations in
more strident terms, stating "[s]ome of the judges are racist--I know
this because of comments they have made to me."' 72 A white woman
attorney also stated that racist and sexist comments are made about
73
her clients by opposing counsel, the parties, and judges. 1
As with the questions regarding community impact and input,
the difference between the responses of attorneys of color and white
attorneys to question 51 was minor. The majority of attorneys of
color (58% -14 of 24 useable responses) responded that the race of
their clients had a negative effect on their treatment. As one Latino
attorney put it, "[m]ost of the time I'm led to believe that my client
has the burden of proof. The assumption is that, if the client is
Latino/a, she must be on welfare and must be guilty, even in cases
174
where the petitioner is a well-known slum lord."'
It should be noted that the same white attorneys, who in
earlier questions generally denied that race had an impact on how
they dealt with clients, were willing to state that race is a factor in
how other whites (judges) treat those same clients. This may reflect
See supraPart II.A.
169 See supra Part IV.A.
170 Survey #55.
171 Survey #20.
168

172

Survey #61.

Survey #53.
174 Survey #11.
173
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their recognition that there continues to be racism in society in
general, but discomfort with the notion that they may be a part ofthis
structure of subordination. It is also entirely possible that the answer
patterns of the white attorneys reflects that they are, in fact, more
aware and culturally sensitive to their clients of color than the judges
before whom they appear.
Question #53: Do believe that your race has an effect on the
treatment that you receive from the court?
Answers on a scale of 1 (negative effect) to 5 (positive effect)
with 3 being no effect.
For tabulation purposes, answers of"l" and "2" were counted
as a negative effect; "3" was counted no effect; and answers
of "4" and "5" were counted as a positive effect.
Given the responses to question 52, we should expect the
attorneys to indicate that their race does have an effect on how they
are treated by the courts. A large majority of white attorneys (71%)
were willing to admit that their race resulted in better treatment by
judges and court personnel. Here was one of the rare occasions in our
survey that white attorneys as a group aligned with the Race
Consciousness Model. When it comes to acknowledging that race
plays a role in the treatment an attorney receives from the court,
white attorneys are very cognizant of the favorable treatment they
receive. Additionally, where whites were earlier reluctant to state that
race had an impact in the client's representation, here, by a large
majority, they were willing to see racism as practiced by others.
The answers of the attorneys of color were more difficult to
interpret. Forty-seven percent (11 of 23 useable responses) of
attorneys of color indicated that their race had a negative effect on the
treatment they received from the court. While this percentage was
more than 900 percent higher than the responses of white attorneys
(only 5 percent of white attorneys answered that their race had a
negative effect), the number was still surprising. It was assumed that
since attorneys of color indicated that the race of their clients had a
negative effect on the treatment that they, received, the attorneys
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would indicatethat their race also had a negative effect on how they
were treated.
Even more surprising was that nearly one-third (30%) of
attorneys of color indicated that their race had a positive effect on the
treatment they received. One possible explanation for this response is
that this group of attorneys presumed that their favorable treatment
was based on status and not race alone. Perhaps these attorneys were
treated better than their clients because they were professionals
admitted to the Bar?
A majority ofmen of color (62%) indicated that their race had
a negative effect on how they were treated. Among the women of
color, however, only 40 percent indicated that their race has a
negative effect on how they were treated. The answers of the men of
color clearly align with the Race Consciousness Model, but the
responses of women of color are more difficult to interpret.
D.

Race and The Workplace

Question #61: Attorneys of color and white attorneys have
the same opportunities for advancement.
Answers on a scale of 1 (disagree) to 5 (agree).
Question #62: Performances of attorneys of color and white
attorneys are judged by the same standards.
Answers on a scale of 1 (disagree) to 5 (agree).
For tabulation purposes, answers of "1" and "2" were
considered as disagreeing with the question; "3" was
considered as neutral or no response; and answers of"4" and
"5" were considered as agreeing with the question.
The answers to these questions do not necessarily implicate
either model discussed previously, in that the questions do not deal
with relationships with clients. However, the questions do have
implications for the Lees' arguments. If the Lees are correct, then we
would expect most attorneys to disagree with these statements,
presuming they were aware of the inequities. Perhaps, though, the
Lees would also argue that white attorneys would not be aware of the
more limited opportunities for advancement for attorneys of color,
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and would therefore agree with both statements, while attorneys of
color would disagree with both.
In fact, this is the pattern that emerged. Sixty-four percent of
attorneys of color (14 of 23 useable responses) disagreed with the
statement that attorneys of color and white attorneys have the same
opportunities for advancement. In contrast, 60 percent of the white
attorneys (20 of 33 useable responses) responded that the
opportunities are the same regardless of race.
Answers were similar for question 62. Sixty-three percent of
the white attorneys (21 of 33 useable responses) answered that
attorneys of color and white attorneys are judged by the same
standards. Attorneys of color expressed the opposite view, as fiftysix percent of attorneys of color (13 of 23 useable responses)
disagreed with the statement.
This, then, seems to be the area in which the answers of the
attorneys were most closely correlated with their racial identity
factors. Part of the reluctance of white attorneys to answer that there
is a different standard for attorneys of different races may be an
unwillingness to state that they may have an unfair advantage over
their colleagues of color within their organizations. The implication
is that they may have175achieved their positions unfairly, simply by
virtue of being white.
But there is also a second plausible explanation for the
answers of white attorneys to these questions. Because whites in our
society are taught at an early age not to recognize the privileges that
are inherent in being part of the ruling hegemony, 176 whites may
actually be unable to recognize that they have better opportunities and
are judged by a more lenient standard than their colleagues of color.
This question implicates race in a very personal way; white
attorneys disagreeing with this question may very well have to
confront the notion that they do indeed benefit from racism and that
predominately white organizations do not function as meritocracies.
Unlike the earlier questions dealing with race and the courts, here the
benefits of bias against people of color would inure directly to the
175
176

See supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
See supranotes 43-46 and accompanying text.
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white attorneys, rather than indirectly to their clients of color.
Additionally, the previous questions dealt with racism from without,
whereas this question deals with racism from within the attorneys'
own organization.
Attorneys of color, on the other hand, to a large extent feel
that they are not treated fairly by their organization, and that racism
permeates their experience ofbeing attorneys, even when not dealing
directly with clients or the judicial system. This seems to support the
claims made in the Lees' article, that the management of legal
services organizations often replicates the discrimination present in
society. This also supports the perception by many people of color
that predominately white organizations like the Civil Division are
neopigmentocracies, and not meritocracies as the predominately
white management contends. 177 A neopigmentocracy is an
organization characterized by rules that require the enfranchisement
of all persons regardless of race, accompanied "by a psychological
mindset on the part of the dominant race that reinforces a sense of
entitlement characteristic of a racially caste society."' 178 Within a
neopigmentocracy, people of color are permitted to attain "acceptable
79
positions" but as a group are excluded from management positions. 1
As people of color attempt to move beyond "acceptable positions" in
a neopigmentocracy, "racist forces are mobilized to stunt . . .
180
careers."
Thus, as far as people of color are concerned, two salient
features identify neopigmentocracies: 1) the absence of people of
color in management positions; and 2) a high turnover rate among
people of color because of the absence of equal opportunities.
According to the Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) report
177

See CLAYTON P. ALDERFER & DAVID A. THOMAS, THE INFLUENCE OF RACE
ON CAREER DYNAMICs: THEORY AND RESEARCH ON MINORITY CAREER
EXPERIENCES, HANDBOOK INCAREER THEORY 133, 148 (1989).

178 Idat 148-49.

179 Id. at 149. This concept is also commonly referred to as the "glass ceiling."
See, e.g., Mary Daly, Rebuilding the City of Richmond: Congress's Power to
Authorize the States to Implement Race-ConsciousAffirmative Action Plans,33

B.C. L. REV. 903 (1992) (discussing Congress' adoption ofthe Glass Ceiling Act of
1991 to combat gender discrimination in the workplace); Deborah L. Rhode,
Feminism andthe State, 107 HARv. L. REV. 1181 (1994) (noting that glass ceilings
have been documented in virtually every business and professional sector).
180 Alderfer & Thomas, supranote 177.
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issued by The Legal Aid Society in 1995, both of these features are
present in the Civil Division. 1 Not only do attorneys of color
account for only 23 percent of management positions,18 2 but 51
percent of all the staff attorneys who left the Civil Division
between
July 1993 and November 1995 were people of color. 183
E. The Neutrality and Race Consciousness Models and
Group Dynamics Within the Civil Division
An analysis of the survey answers reveals that Civil Division
attorneys of The Legal Aid Society do not fit neatly into either the
Neutrality or Race Consciousness Model based solely on race or
ethnic background. While white attorneys and attorneys of color
clearly align with a particular model on some answers, the answers to
other questions are at best amorphous and difficult to interpret. For
example, when asked if race was an issue in the representation of
clients, white attorneys as a group aligned with the Neutrality Model
and answered "no." Attorneys of color, on the other hand, answered
"yes", that race was an issue, consistent with the Race Consciousness
Model. But when asked if they take the race of the client into
consideration during their representation, attorneys of color answered
"no", seemingly departing from the Race Consciousness Model. It is
difficult to reconcile these two answers from attorneys of color. If
race is an issue in the representation of clients, it would make sense to
take the race of the client into consideration when representing that
client. While attorneys of color gave seemingly conflicting answers
to these two questions, the answers of the white attorneys were
consistent. Since white attorneys did not think that race was an issue
in the representation of clients, they indicated that they did not take
the clients' race into consideration.
The discrepancies in answers continue when we examine
other responses. In response to question 50, "I believe that attorneys
181 See EEO REPORT, supranote 119.
182

See id.

See The Legal Aid Society, Civil Division Affirmative Action Committee,
Nov. 28, 1995. In one Civil Division neighborhood office, 85 percent of the staff
attorneys of color left the organization within a twenty-month period. See id.
During the same period, 23 percent of the white staff attorneys left. See id.
183
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of color are more effective representatives of people of color", the
overwhelming majority of white attorneys disagreed with the
statement. Again, the answers of the white attorneys were consistent
with the Neutrality Model. As expected, a majority of attorneys of
color agreed with the statement, consistent with the Race
Consciousness Model.
However, when asked if "Clients are more open with
attorneys of the same race as them", both groups of attorneys appear
to have changed their positions. In response to this question, a
majority of white attorneys did not disagree. Likewise, the attorneys
of color did not voice strong agreement. It seems logical that if white
attorneys do not think that attorneys of color are more effective
representatives of people of color, then they would also think that
clients of color are not more open with attorneys of the same race as
them. In drawing this conclusion, it must be remembered that the
majority of Legal Aid clients are people of color 184 and
attorney/client communications are crucial to the success of any
representation. Thus, if white attorneys do not think that attorneys of
color are more effective representatives of people of color, they
should probably also believe that attorneys of color do not have an
advantage in communicating with clients of color. On the other hand,
one of the reasons attorneys of color probably believe that they are
more effective representatives of people of color is because of
enhanced attorney/client communications due, in part, to the client
being more open with attorneys that look like them or have similar
ethnic backgrounds. Yet strangely, attorneys of color did not seem to
think that clients are more open with attorneys of the same race as
them. Another area of the survey where one group, white attorneys,
appeared to vacillate between the Neutrality and Race Consciousness
Models was on the topic of "Race and the Courts." As previously
noted, as a group white attorneys indicated that race is not an issue in
the representation of clients. White attorneys also indicated that their
race did not affect how they represented their clients. Both of these
answers are consistent with the Neutrality Model. But when asked
how a client's and an attorney's race affected the treatment they
received from the courts, white attorneys appear to abandon the

184
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Neutrality Model and align themselves with the Race Consciousness
Model instead.
When white attorneys were asked if a client's race has a
positive or negative effect on the treatment a client receives from the
court, they indicated that it had a negative effect. But when asked if
an attorney's race has a positive or negative effect on the treatment
they receive from the courts, white attorneys indicated that it had a
positive effect. Here, white attorneys apparently no longer think that
race is irrelevant and, thus, clearly depart from the Neutrality Model.
Instead, when it comes to the courts, white attorneys appear to be
very cognizant of the issue of race.
Once again, it is difficult to interpret these seemingly
contradictory answers. Certainly, if a client's race affects how the
courts will treat that client, then race must be an issue in the
representation of the client. Likewise, if a white attorney receives
more favorable treatment from the courts because of her race, then
the race of an attorney must have an effect on how that attorney
represents the client.
A possible explanation for the conflicting survey answers
among the two groups of attorneys may lie in an examination of
group dynamics. According to Alderfer and Thomas, two types of
groups exist within organizations: identity groups and organization
groups' 8 5 Identity group members share common biological
characteristics or historical experiences and thus tend to develop
similar worldviews.' 8 6 Identity groups are often based on race,
ethnicity, gender, age, or family. Organization groups, on the other
hand, are based on task, function, and hierarchy.18 Members of
organization groups perform similar "tasks, participate in comparable
work experiences and, as a result, tend to develop common
organizational views."' 8 8 Because people often join and leave
organizations, organization membership is fluid and changes over
time. Conversely, since most people are born into identity groups,
membership tends to remain constant or change slowly as the result
of natural development.
18sSee Alderfer & Thomas, supranote 177, at 145.
186 See id.
187 See id.
188 See id.
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Within Legal Aid all attorneys, regardless of race, belong to
both an identity group and an organization group. Depending on
factors such as race, ethnicity, gender, and age, an attorney can
belong to one or multiple identity groups. For example, a sixty-yearold African-American woman attorney may belong to the identity
groups of women, African-Americans, and the elderly. A thirty-five
year old white male, on the other hand, may only identify with the
ruling white male hegemony within our society.' 89 Regardless ofthe
identity group(s) an attorney belongs to, all the attorneys in the Civil
Division will be part of the organization group that consists of
attorneys employed by The Legal Aid Society.
Membership in identity and organization groups affects the
way in which an attorney views the world, including race. Clearly, a
Black Latina attorney who was raised in poverty and experienced
discrimination firsthand will view racism differently that a white
male raised in affluent suburbs who has been taught to disregard the
"invisible package of unearned assets" 190 that accrue merely as the
result of his gender and skin color. Having experienced racism and
painfully aware of its effects, the Black Latina's views of race will be
shaped by her experiences and the experiences of others in her
identity group. Accordingly, this woman will probably not think that
"[o]ur Constitution is color-blind"' 91 and most of her views could
probably be explained by the Race Consciousness Model. The white
male attorney, on the other hand, may very well be oblivious to the
issue of race. Having never been discriminated against and taught
from an early age to disregard the privileges of his own race and
gender, 192 this attorney probably does believe that the law is neutral
and, thus, most of his views will probably align with the Neutrality
Model.

189

Of course, like the African-American attorney, the white male can also be

associated with other identity groups by age, gender, etc. However, because of
"white privilege" and "male privilege", a white male may not realize that he is part
of multiple identity groups. See McIntosh, supranote 43. White males are taught
not to recognize the advantages that accrue as the result of their race and gender.
See id.
190 See id.
191 See supra Part II.B.
192 See supra note 43-46
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But while identity group membership may determine which of
the two models explain some of an attorney's views, organization
group membership also influences an attorney's perceptions. It is
well documented that group members often adjust their views to fit
within the group norm. In one study examining the dynamics of
group pressure, participants were asked how much a stationary point
of light moved. 193 Although the light was stationary, the participants
gradually adjusted their estimates to fit within the prevailing group
norm, which always indicated movement. 194 As members of Legal
Aid, the responding attorneys may have adjusted their answers to fit
within the prevailing norm of the organization. If so, this could
explain why no one model can adequately explain all the answers of
either of the groups of attorneys. In responding to some answers,
attorneys may be exhibiting their group identities when aligning with
either the Neutrality or Race Consciousness Models. On other
answers, however, when it appears that the same group of attorneys
departs from a previously stated position, the group may be
succumbing to group pressure and exhibiting its organizational
identity.
For example, when asked if race was an issue in the
representation of clients, attorneys of color answered "yes." This
answer, as noted above, aligns with the Race Consciousness Model.
But when asked if they take the race of the client into consideration
during their representation, this same group of attorneys answered
"no", this time aligning themselves more with the Neutrality Model.
These seemingly contradictory answers may be explained by
examining group memberships.
As members of identity groups based on race and ethnicity,
attorneys of color are probably very aware that race is always an issue
in society at large and, thus, must be an issue in legal representation.
However, as members of Legal Aid, attorneys of color are part of an
organization that expects its employees to be color-blind and to serve
all of its clients equally. The expectation within Legal Aid that all
clients, regardless of race, should receive comparable services is
probably based on a number of factors. First, Legal Aid attorneys are
193
194

See Alderfer & Thomas, supranote 49, at 3.
See id.
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merely a subset of all attorneys. As attorneys, Legal Aid employees
have been indoctrinated on the "Rule of Law" and taught to disregard
race. Thus, as an organization all of Legal Aid's attorneys may
merely be adjusting their answers to fit within the group norm that
they learned and adopted in law school. Second, as noted above, 77
percent of the supervising attorneys within the Civil Division are
white males. As a group, white males continually aligned with the
Neutrality Model during our survey and thought that race was not an
issue. Accordingly, if attorneys of color want to advance within the
Legal Aid, they may align their views with that of the ruling
hegemony to win the approval of their supervisors. By indicating that
they do not take the race of the client into consideration during
representation, attorneys of color may simply be conforming to
organizational expectations.
Among white attorneys, group dynamics may also explain
seemingly contradictory answers. When asked if race is an issue in
the representation of clients, white attorneys overwhelmingly
answered "no", adhering to the Neutrality Model where race is never
an issue. But when asked to indicate if their race had a positive or
negative effect on the treatment they received from the court, white
attorneys indicated that their race had a positive effect. In response to
this question, white attorneys appear to have abandoned the
Neutrality Model and become acutely aware of race. Unlike the
responses of attorneys of color, the conflicting answers here are
probably not the result of any antagonism between identity and
organization group membership. Rather, the conflicting answers may
be explained by membership in only an identity group.
As part of the identity group of the "white majority", whites
steadfastly adhere to the Neutrality Model and do not recognize race
as an issue. This may be because whites are oblivious to race as the
result of "white privilege", 195 or it may be that whites are reluctant to
admit that attorneys of color may be more effective representatives of
people of color if race is an issue in legal representation. On the
other hand, when benefits inure to whites merely as the result of their
skin color, whites suddenly become aware of race, aligning
themselves with the Race Consciousness Model. While the sudden
recognition of race seemingly contradicts other answers of white
195

See supranotes 43-46 and accompanying text.
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attorneys, the answers can still be explained by identity group
membership. This time, however, white attorneys are identifying
with the group simply because of the advantages of being white and
not because of "white privilege" or their reluctance to admit that
attorneys of color may, in certain cases, be more effective
representatives of people of color.
It should be noted, however, that the argument that attorneys
of color are more effective representatives. of people of color has a
flip side that may be especially troubling to attorneys of color. If
attorneys of color are more effective representatives of people of
color merely based on their skin color, whites could argue that they
are more effective representatives of white clients. This argument
could possibly support excluding attorneys of color from major
corporate firms where the majority of clients are white, since the
firms would naturally want to hire the most effective attorneys.
Identity group membership also helps to explain the
seemingly anomalous answers of an Asian male who responded to the
survey. Unlike his attorney of color colleagues, this attorney's
responses echoed those ofhis white male counterparts. In response to
a number of key questions on race, this Asian male indicated that 1)
he did not take the race of a client into consideration during
representation; 2) clients do not take the race of their attorney into
consideration; 3) race has no effect on how he represents clients; and
4) attorneys of color are not more effective representatives of people
of color. But while these responses do not follow the general pattern
of answers by other Legal Aid attorneys of color, they probably can
be explained by identity group membership.
An examination of some ofthe other survey responses of this
Asian male attorney indicates that, despite being a person of color, he
readily relates to the identity group of white males. His affinity
towards this group can probably be traced to extensive socialization.
In his survey answers, this attorney indicated that he was raised in a
predominately white, middle class, suburban environment. This
attorney also indicated that in his three years at Legal Aid, he worked
in an office where the majority of attorneys, including the managing
attorneys, were white males. Having been raised and later employed
in an environment where his white friends and colleagues have been
taught to disregard the privileges that inure to them based solely on
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race, this attorney may either truly believe that race does not matter in
society or legal representation; or, he may, like some of his white
friends and colleagues, be totally oblivious to issues of race because
he was raised in an environment where race played little, if any, role.
Group dynamics also help to explain the tensions and
conflicts that exist between white attorneys and attorneys of color.
Within any organization there is interface between identity and
organization groups. This interface can lead to tension and
conflicts.196 How an organization manages these tensions and
conflicts depends, in part, on a concept called intergroup
embeddedness. Within any organization there are two types of
embeddedness:
congruent and incongruent. 197
Congruent
embeddedness occurs where the power relations in an organization
mirror those in society as a whole. 198 For example, with regard to
race, congruent embeddedness is present in an organization in which
whites occupy high status positions and people of color are found in
low power, low status positions. This organizational race pattern
mirrors the power relations in society at large. On the other hand, if
people of color occupied the high status positions in an organization
and whites occupied the lower echelons, incongruent embeddedness
would be present. Alderfer and Thomas have noted that in
organizations where congruent embeddedness exists, evaluations of
racial minorities by the controlling whites are likely to be inaccurate
and may reflect the anxieties of the dominant group in race
relations. 199 This could possibly explain the answers of both groups
of attorneys to question 62, where attorneys were asked if they agreed
or disagreed with the statement that attorneys of color and white
attorneys are judged by the same standards. Sixty-five percent of
white attorneys agreed with this statement, while 64 percent of
attorneys of color disagreed. In an organization such as Legal Aid
where congruent embeddedness exists, it is possible to have
conflicting answers to this question. Because attorneys of color only
occupy a minority of management positions, they may be justified in
196
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believing that they are judged by a higher standard than whites. On
the other hand, the answers of the majority of white attorneys may
reflect their inaccurate evaluations of attorneys of color.
Examining group dynamics within the Civil Division not only
helps to explain the seemingly contradictory answers of attorneys of
color and white attorneys, it also lends support to the conclusion that
neither the Neutrality Model nor the Race Consciousness Model
dominates within the Civil Division. While race and ethnicity played
a large part in determining which model attorneys aligned with, the
two models could not adequately explain all the answers of a
particular group of attorneys. Rather, the conclusion to be drawn is
that Civil Division attorneys are operating under a hybrid of the two
models. While adherence to the hybrid model may lead to conflicting
answers between the two groups of attorneys, those conflicts can
often be explained by examining group memberships.
F.

Examining the Lees' Theory About Racial Bias in
the Provision of Legal Services to the Poor

One of the purposes of the survey was to test some of the
arguments posited by the Lees in their article Reflections from the
Bottom of the Well: RacialBias in the ProvisionofLegal Services to
the Poor.200 In their article, the Lees contend that the plight of poor
legal services clients is as bad or worse now than at any time during
the 25 year history of legal services programs. 2 1 The Lees attribute
the plight of the poor to the failure of legal services offices to address
the connection between race and poverty. According to the Lees, the
policies set by the predominately white legal services management
fail to reflect the needs ofthe clients who are overwhelmingly people
of color.20 2 The result is that many of the problems encountered by
poor people of color--discrimination, institutional
racism, inequitable
le -203
distribution of resources--go unchallenged.
The Lees further posit
that the predominately white management of legal services offices
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See supra note 71 and accompanying text.

202 See supra note
203 See supra note

98 and accompanying text.
96 and accompanying text.
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gain self-esteem by looking down upon their clients of color, 20 4 suffer
from an unacknowledged "empowerment phobia,"20 5 and are thus
reluctant to share their power either attorneys or clients of color.20 6
An examination of Legal Aid's Civil Division and its policies
lends credence to some of the Lees' arguments. To begin with, the
vast majority (77 percent) of the Civil Division's managing attorneys
are white. 20 7 The policies set by this predominately white
management focus on providing individual representation and not on
litigating for systemic reform. Between 1994-96, the Civil Division
exhibited a marked shift toward individual client representation in
Housing Court and away from systemic reform.
The Civil Division has also shown a reluctance to share power
with attorneys of color. Only two ofthe 11 Civil Division offices that
serve clients have management attorneys of color.20 8 Only one Civil
Division office has an attorney-in-charge or an assistant attorney-incharge who is a person of color.209 Additionally, only two of the 11
management positions that were filled between October 1993 and
December 1995 were filled with attorneys of color.210
However, standing alone, the composition of the Civil
Division's management and their current service policies do not
adequately support the Lees' premise that legal services' white
management suffers from "empowerment phobia 21 ' and gains selfesteem by looking down upon their poor clients of color.212 The Lees
fail to cite to any empirical data or studies to support their premise
and our survey was not intended to probe the psychological mindset
of the Civil Division's management. An analysis of our survey data
does, however, provide alternate explanations for the composition of
the Civil Division management and the policies set by that
management.
204 See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
205 See supranote 102 and accompanying text.
206 See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
207 See supranote 120 and accompanying text.
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The predominately white Civil Division management is
probably best explained in terms of subtle racism rather than any
"empowerment phobia." During our survey, white attorneys and
attorneys of colored disagreed on whether attorneys of color and
white attorneys have the same opportunities for advancement and on
the standards by which attorney performances are judged.2 13 Sixtyseven percent of attorneys of color indicated that attorneys of color
and white attorneys do not have the same opportunities for
advancement, while 72 percent ofwhite attorneys responded that the
opportunities were the same. 2 14 Similarly, 64 percent of attorneys of
color indicated that attorneys of color were held to a higher standard
than white attorneys; 65 percent of the white attorneys responded
that attorneys of color and white attorneys were judged by the same
standards.215
The alarming differences in the responses ofthe two groups of
attorneys can be sufficiently explained. As previously noted, whites
are taught at an early age not to recognize the privileges that are
inherent in being part of the ruling hegemony. z 6 Thus, whites may
actually be unaware that they are afforded better opportunities in life
and are judged by a more lenient standard than people of color.
People of color, on the other hand, tend to be more conscious of race
and probably perceive a predominately white organization like the
Civil Division as a neopigmentocracy and not a meritocracy.2 17 Two
salient features identify a neopigmentocracy: 1) the absence of
people of color in management positions; and 2) a high turnover rate
among people
of color because of the absence of equal
2 18
opportunities.
While both of these features are clearly present in the Civil
Division, 219 racism provides a more plausible explanation for their
presence than does any "empowerment phobia" theory. Within a
neopigmentocracy, people of color are permitted to attain "acceptable
See supranotes 151-54 and accompanying text.
See supraPart IV.D.
See supranote 151 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 43-46, 153 and accompanying text.
See supranote 154 and accompanying text.
218 See supra Part IV.D.
219 See supranotes 120, 160 and accompanying text.
213
214
215
216
217
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positions" 220 but are stunted by "racist forces" as they attempt to
attain management positions. 221 Racism, then, could account for the
small number of management attorneys of color because attorneys of
color are prohibited from rising above "acceptable positions."
Racism could also account for the high turnover rate, as attorneys of
color leave the Civil Division because of the absence of
opportunities.
The Lees also posit that the predominately white
management of legal services offices set service policies that fail to
address the problems of poor people of color because management
gains self-esteem by looking down upon their poor clients of color
and thus has no motive to empower their clients. There exists,
however, at least two other alternate explanations for the polices set
by the predominately white Civil Division management. One
explanation, and the one frequently espoused by the Legal Aid
management, is that the recent focus on individual representation, as
opposed to systemic reform litigation, generates millions of dollars in
fees that enable Legal Aid to employ more attorneys who, in turn,
service more clients.
A second plausible explanation is that the predominately
white management, who operate principally within the Neutrality
Model, do not recognize race as a factor when devising service
policies for their offices. Obviously, the failure to recognize race as a
factor results in the absence of any systemic strategies aimed at
addressing discrimination, institutional racism, the inequitable
distribution of resources and other problems that disproportionately
impact upon poor people of color.
While it appears that the Lees are correct in their assessment
that racial bias occurs in the provision of legal services to the poor, it
cannot be stated with certainty that the racial bias is the result the
white management's "empowerment phobia" and the need to gain
self-esteem by looking down upon poor clients of color. Institutional
racism, which the Lees may argue is grounded in empowerment of
the majority and a search for self-esteem, may also account for the
predominately white management of the Civil Division and the high
turn-over rate among attorneys of color. Additionally, fiscal
220 See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
221 See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
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motivations and the Neutrality Model provide alternate explanations
for the Civil Division's service policies that failure to systemically
address many of the problems of poor clients of color. It appears that
further research is needed before the arguments posited by the Lees
can be proved or discarded.
V.

CONCLUSION

The results of the survey reveal that the perceptions of
attorneys of color and white attorneys on the impact that race has on
the law and lawyering cannot be adequately explained by either the
Neutrality Model or the Race Consciousness Model. Clearly,
attorneys do not align with either model based solely on their race.
Rather, there are some general differences in how people perceive
race and the effects that race has on legal representation and the
treatment clients and attorneys receive at the hands of the courts and
by their own organization.
As a group, attorneys of color were much more likely to
perceive both the advantages and the disadvantages that came with
being of color. Advantages in dealing with their clients, including
better communication; but disadvantages in the treatment received by
the courts and in the workplace. Although white attorneys were less
likely to perceive the effects of race in their dealings with clients,
many did note that it was an issue. A large percentage of the white
attorneys believed that race has an impact on their client's treatment
by the judicial system.
But while neither the Neutrality Model nor the Race
Consciousness Model could adequately explain all the answers from
both groups of attorneys, the survey did reveal that all the
participating attorneys recognized race as a significant factor in some
aspect of their professional lives, whether it was the attorney-client
relationship, dealing with the courts or treatment in the workplace.
Thus, it appears that as society and the legal profession become more
diverse, race is beginning to have an impact on the law and
lawyering, at least within the realm of The Legal Aid Society.
Additionally, the failure of either model to adequately explain all the
answers of a given group of attorneys also lends credence to the
proposition that Legal Aid attorneys are operating under a hybrid of
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the two models and are exhibiting their identity group and
organization memberships.
The question, then, is where to go from here. Clearly there is
the need for further study of this issue. In particular, if we are to
improve the position of attorneys of color, as well as clients of color,
the study must be expanded outside the realm of "poverty law,"
where most clients are people of color, and where attorneys of color
have arguably more opportunity than in other areas of the law.
Several options or approaches must be examined. For
example, perhaps the Professional Identity Model is not being
ingrained enough in students in our law schools. If people of color,
and some whites, place an emphasis on the importance of race,
perhaps neutrality is not being sufficiently taught.
More likely, though, if whites are less sensitive to racial
differences, law schools should focus more on these differences, and
more on communication skills. In a society that is severely stratified
along racial lines, whites and people of color probably share fewer
common experiences than law schools may be assuming. Because
law is taught from a neutral perspective, we may be inhibiting white
students, who most likely have not been forced to examine racial
issues, from developing the sensitivity that may be necessary to
effectively advocate for people of color. At the same time, we may
be alienating students of color by refusing to acknowledge
differences in people and their treatment by society in general, and by
the law. Perhaps, then, the time has finally arrived for our law
schools to acknowledge that the pursuit of colorblindness is an
inadequate social policy by which to achieve justice within our legal
system.
What we should strive for, then, is a legal education system
that teaches students that both whites and people of color should be
conscious and sensitive to the issue of race. Students must also be
taught that race consciousness and sensitivity can be learned,
regardless of race, class, ethnicity or other personal identity factors.
Finally, students and seasoned attorneys alike, must be shown the
need to examine how their actions as lawyers relate to issues of race.

